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PREFACE

The *Military Chaplains' Review* is designed as a medium in which those interested in the military chaplaincy can share with chaplains the product of their experience and research. We welcome articles which are directly concerned with supporting and strengthening chaplains professionally. Preference will be given to those articles having lasting value as reference material.

The *Military Chaplains' Review* is published quarterly. The opinions reflected in each article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Chief of Chaplains or the Department of the Army.

Articles should be submitted in duplicate, double spaced, to the Editor, Military Chaplains' Review, United States Army Chaplain Board, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755. Articles should be approximately 15 to 30 pages in length and, when appropriate, should be carefully footnoted.

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IN THIS ISSUE

One way of measuring whether we have an effective chaplaincy is to think in terms of the concept of *proximity*. A few of the gauges would be the following: closeness to the truth of God, closeness to the hearers of the Word and closeness to the point where religious values influence human behavior. In this issue Professor Earl H. Furgeson is on that target, for he reminds us of some of the homiletical principles we learned in seminary and should be practicing now. The sermon, he insists, begins with a Word which comes from God; it also begins in the situation of the listener. The chaplain's distinctive mission is to proclaim the Word of which he is a servant. He cannot proclaim it without interpreting it and translating it into the experience of his audience.

Of course, being 'with it' when we are in the pulpit is not quite the same thing as counseling men and women as they make the critical ethical decisions faced in military life. Being a reasonable facsimile of "wonderful counselor" in these settings takes not only presence, prayer, and pulpit prowess, but also a good measure of ethical training. In this matter Dr. Paul Ramsey writes on the importance of using clear language and correct concepts, as well as making the fundamental distinctions appropriate in an age when *feeling* has almost *replaced* thinking, instead of complementing it.

To many of us today, the question of closeness to reality becomes meaningful only in the context of change. We are expected to be change agents because we ourselves are changed men. Two articles in this issue concern themselves with the salutary changes which I believe are occurring in the military chaplaincy. Dr. Cyril Mill describes what is being done to help chaplains promote individual and social change. In order that people may more fully express their individual identity, achieve group cohesiveness and witness to the love of God, he says that a concerted effort is under way to change the self concept of Army chaplains from reactive to proactive. It is an advance toward a more aggressive involvement with social concerns in the military environment. The long range benefits of these efforts should help to make the chaplaincy a force of consequence in the military.

Chaplain (LTC) Wendell T. Wright cites specific examples of these changes. He describes the results of an early human relations workshop which focused on self-awareness and inter-

personal relations, especially as these relate to racism, drug abuse and differing life-styles of youth. Chaplains changed in that workshop—not in one direction, but individually in various directions according to each chaplain's needs. Human relations workshops have since been offered to chaplains all over the world.

Proximity is also the central element in the church-state question. How dangerous is the intimacy of God and Caesar epitomized by the chaplain's role? Two articles, as well as two book reviews, discuss the religious liberty—church and state question. The first article is by Chaplain (COL) Bertram C. Gilbert, who analyzes the position of Thomas Jefferson on this subject. Chaplain Gilbert's thesis is that one's understanding of Jefferson is colored by one's present-day interpretation of the First Amendment. Chaplain (COL) Wilford E. Smith analyzes some of the important Supreme Court decisions dealing with the question of conscientious objection, a matter which has brought the church-state question especially close to all chaplains as they have counseled soldiers in recent years.

Some years ago *Time* magazine reported the comment of a soldier in Vietnam who was being asked leading questions about the value of his chaplain. His reply, which is something of a classic defense of our ministry was, "You wouldn't understand, you weren't with us." Still, the status of a mere accompaniment is not enough for us. We need to be the ever-present teachers of the songs of faith men sing in a strange land, the supporters of the worthy causes they espouse, the inspirers of the visions they grope for as they seek God—in short, the attending physicians of their souls.

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Chaplain (Major General), USA
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WHERE DOES A SERMON BEGIN?

Earl H. Furgeson, S.T.D., Ph.D.

I

The late Professor Halford Luccock, teacher of preachers at Yale, asked the question, "Where does a sermon begin?" and replied, "It begins where a river begins—in the sky." [1] Just as a river begins with the gentle rain that falleth from heaven, so the sermon begins with a Word which comes to the preacher from above. As Luccock would say, the preacher is the channel for a message, not the source of it. Certainly the Old Testament prophets would have agreed, because their proclamations were messages which they received; they were not messages which they invented. The validation of their preaching and the source of their courage were embodied in the familiar words, ". . . And the Word of the Lord came unto me!" They proclaimed what had been revealed to them and they always thought of themselves as "speaking for" the Lord, which is what the word *prophet* (prophaino) means. They took the idea of inspiration quite literally: they breathed in (in-spiro) what was outside themselves, without which they could not survive, and they breathed out upon the people what they had received.

The proclamational theories of preaching, both Catholic and Protestant, honor this "givenness" of the Gospel. The Word of God is from God; the preacher is the "servant of the Word," and recognition of that fact should make him humble and keep him humble. "Preaching," said Karl Barth, "is the Word of God which he himself hath spoken." [2] In the sermon the preacher is carried beyond human thinking to God "who utters the first and the last word."

Both Catholic and Protestant versions of the proclamational theory of preaching share the conviction that a sermon begins with a revelation. Roman Catholic thinkers tend to locate the source and content of the revelation in tradition or the church; Protestant thinkers incline toward finding the source and content in the Bible or the creed. "The heart of the message," says Fred-

[1] *In the Minister's Workshop* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1944) p. 14.

[2] *The Preaching of the Gospel* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963) p. 9.

Dr. Furgeson is Professor of Preaching and Pastoral Theology at Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, D.C. He has published articles on preaching and pastoral care in numerous periodicals, including *The Christian Century, Religion and Life, Pastoral Psychology, The Journal of Pastoral Care,* and *The New Christian Advocate.* This article was originally presented to chaplains attending the First US Army Homiletics Institute in April 1972.

erick M. Morris, a Protestant Episcopalian, "is, of course, summarized in the creed," [3] and the creed sets forth the doctrines of the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Atonement. This limited content would not be satisfactory to all Protestants; it is, as Morris says, the "heart" of the message. Others would wish to add the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, the belief in the Second Advent, the plenary inspiration of the Bible, etc.

Despite the difficulties in various proclamational theories—and they are formidable—the aim, nonetheless, is sound. To draw near to the "fountainhead of the tradition" and to find a reference point outside the preacher is of singular importance for preaching, because this would tend to correct the personal subjectivities of the preacher and to lift preaching above the cultural relativities of history by providing a reference point for the propositional content of the sermon. If, in addition, it tended to rescue preaching from the banalities of topical sermons, that would be a side benefit equal in merit to a deliverance from Original Sin.

If a topical sermon is defined as one which develops a subject not logically presented in a text or passage of scripture, then one would have to say that the fault with much preaching today is that it is so insufferably topical. Instead of developing a subject *present* in a text, the topical sermon presents a subject *suggested* by a text, or by a word in a text, and develops the suggested subject according to the personal and private impressions of the preacher, the text serving only as a pretext. An offensive example of this popular procedure is the sermon, often cited, about a pencil, the sermon allegedly based on the text in which Pilate said, "What I have written, I have written." The imaginative author of this so-called sermon on the pencil developed his thoughts on the subject by proceeding analogically: The graphite is the soul of the pencil and the wood is the body of the pencil, which reminds us that the soul is more important than the body because the soul is the living substance which writes the life history of the person. The eraser of the pencil eliminates our mistakes, and that takes place in life when one's sins are blotted out by the merciful love of God. All this we should think of when we hear the text, "What I have written, I have written." The fault here, to mention only one, is that the text has nothing to do with any of this. Pilate had never seen a pencil, and he could not have found in all the Empire an eraser large enough to blot out his mistakes.

Impressionistic preaching of this kind, straining after relevance and contemporaneity, has provoked some critics like

[3] *Preach the Word of God (New York:* Morehouse Gorham, 1954) p. 56.

Donald G. Miller to observe that if Protestantism ever dies, the dagger in its back will be the Protestant sermon. "All true preaching," says Miller, "is expository preaching, and that preaching which is not expository is not preaching." [4] The managing editor of *Pulpit* magazine, in a mid-century review of preaching in America, affirmed that the weakest point is the inability of most preachers to prepare and deliver biblical expositions.

One of America's leading religious sociologists, Peter Berger, whose mission it was in 1950 to chide the Protestant churches for their irrelevancy and smug complacency,[5] has now made something of an about-face and today is reminding us that any renaissance of religion will not be led by "the people who have been falling all over each other to be 'relevant to modern man.' Ages of faith are not marked by dialogue, but by proclamation." [6] This sounds like an indictment of the shallow contemporaneity which has characterized much topical preaching; it may be a call to return to the true sources of preaching in the Bible and the faith of the church. Proclamation, we need to remember, is the declaration of a Word from God; it is not the publication of any preacher's private opinions. The Word comes to him from outside and from above.

II

To say that the sermon begins in the apprehension of a kerygmatic truth is to give one answer to the question, Where does a sermon begin? Important as it is to relate the truth of the sermon to the truth of the Bible and the faith of the church, it is equally important to recognize that the sermon also begins in the *situation of the listener.* If a sermon begins in the Bible it must not end there. The main fault with the traditional expository form was that it never got out of the Bible. A preacher would pick a text and then begin with an extensive grammatico-historical exegesis, relating the text to its context, to the historical situation, to the theology of the writer (as understood by the preacher, of course) and the preacher would end, if the listener were lucky, with a few appended practical suggestions related to the life of the listener. It should be recognized that this abusive use of the Bible has been, in our time, the main impetus to the development of topical sermons.

More than forty years ago Harry Emerson Fosdick published an essay entitled, "What is the Matter With Preaching?" [7] This

[4] *The Way to Biblical Preaching* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1957) p. 22.
[5] *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).
[6] *Time*, October 11, 1971, p. 64.
[7] *Harpers*, July, 1928.

essay by the most influential preacher of the time may be fairly rated as making a definitive contribution to homiletical theory in the twentieth century. Fosdick passed judgment upon the expository sermon for its *irrelevance* and upon the topical sermon for its *shallowness*. Referring to the former, he said:

> Many preachers . . . indulge habitually in what they call expository sermons. They take a passage from Scripture and, proceeding on the assumption that the people attending church that morning are deeply concerned about what the passage means, they spend their half hour or more on historical exposition. . . . Could any procedure be more surely predestined to dullness and futility? Who seriously supposes that, as a matter of fact, one in a hundred of the congregation cares, to start with, what Moses, Isaiah, Paul or John meant in those special verses, or came to church deeply concerned about it? . . . Only the preacher proceeds still upon the idea that folk come to church desperately anxious to discover what happened to the Jebusites.

He argued that what the great writers of Scripture were interested in was human living and that if preachers followed that model every sermon would have for its main business "the solving of some problem—a vital important problem, puzzling minds, burdening consciences, distracting lives," and this endeavor "to help people solve their spiritual problems is a sermon's only justifiable aim." Preaching is "wrestling with individuals over questions of life and death, and until that idea of it commands a preacher's mind and method, eloquence will avail him little and theology not at all."

If one needed a text to justify beginning a sermon with the concerns in the lives of the people, one would find it in Ezekiel 3:15–16:

> I came to the exiles at Telabib, who dwelt by the river Chebar, And I sat there overwhelmed among them seven days. And at the end of seven days, the Word of the Lord came to me.

Every true pastor of the flock will testify that the Word of the Lord comes to him as he sits with his people, and every preacher can testify that if the Word which he delivers does not reach into the lives of his listeners it falls back upon itself barren and unfulfilled.

The religious communicator who believes that he can speak the biblical message using only the biblical symbols associated with the truths of the Gospel will learn, if he has eyes to see, that he is not communicating. The biblical symbols were not created once and for all by God in a grand moment of relevation; anyone familiar with the history of the doctrine of the atonement would know that. A *valid* religious symbol is one which is capable of communicating the truth of the Gospel to the common people, the "earnest, artless, loving people," who live in Oshkosh, Wis-

consin or Paradise, Pennsylvania or Bean Blossom, Indiana. Or Fort Polk, Louisiana.

A warning from Karl Barth is appropriate at this point. Barth advised us to remember that the content of God's speech "is never to be conceived and reproduced by us as a general truth." The content of God's Word is a "concretissimum, wherever and whenever God speaks to man." It has something quite special to say to every man, "something that comes straight home to him, and only to him in that way." [8] The preacher's main business is not to inform but to reform, not merely to discuss the meaning of faith but to produce it in the lives of his people, not merely to talk about the power of God but to send people out with it in their possession. The final significance of any sermon is not to be found in the profundity of its thought, the breadth of its information, or in the grace of its literary style, but in the spiritual results it achieves in the lives of the listeners. "Our business as peachers is not to lecture on botany but to raise flowers."

III

This discussion brings us finally to the only answer which can properly be given to the question, Where does the sermon begin? *It begins in the dialectical tension between man's disorder and God's design.* If it starts with the Bible or the faith of the church, it must, before it finishes, embrace the life of man. If it starts with the life of man, it must resort to the Word of God—and the chronology of the operation, whether one commences with the kerygmatic truth or the contemporary situation, is a matter of small import. Man has questions; the Gospel provides answers. The function of the sermon is to bring the two together.

In light of this bi-polar conception of the sermon, the dispute over whether sermons should be textual or topical in form is largely academic. As Alexandre Vinet said long ago, a sermon may be biblical without a text and with a text not biblical at all. The first sermon in Christian history, Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost, was topical in form (as it obviously had to be, since there was no text of scripture available to him to support the realized eschatology which he preached) but we look upon it as the fulfillment of biblical thought on the subject of the Messiah. On the other hand, sermons which bend beneath the weight of biblical citation and exegesis may not achieve the biblical aim of man's redemption in the least, because the Word does not become flesh and dwell among us.

Genuine preaching is never merely an "objective" proclama-

[8] *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936) I,1, p. 159.

tion. How could there be any such thing as an "objective" proclamation anyway? Can anyone really preach what he has not experienced? The most he could do would be to report on what others have experienced, but preaching is not reporting; preaching is testimony. As Arthur L. Teikmanos has said:

> . . . Genuine preaching is not at one time *kerygma* (proclamation) then *didache* (teaching), then *homilia* (discussion), then *paraclesis* (exhortation). No preacher can ever proclaim the good news of God without some interpretation, some discussion, some teaching, and some exhortation. In preaching, kerygma, didache, homilia, and paraclesis always belong together.[9]

There is no proclamation without interpretation. A truth is not proclaimed merely because I have affirmed (or shouted) it or cast it like a rock at the head of the listener, as Tillich would say. The truth is proclaimed only when the listener has perceived and received it into his own life, which he cannot do unless the preacher has helped him to understand the operation of the truth in his own life. If the preacher habitually indulges himself in abstract ideological affirmations, he will encourage the listener to agree with Gilbert and Sullivan that

> The meaning doesn't matter
> If it's only idle chatter
> Of a transcendental kind.

When is a sermon *delivered*? Certainly not when the preacher has stopped talking. A sermon is like a parcel sent from a local merchant. The parcel is not delivered until it has been put into the hand of the consumer and he has signed for it. If the truck breaks down on the way to the house, nothing has been delivered; the recipient, if he is inclined to press the matter, is legally entitled to a refund of his money.

IV

We end as we began. A sermon does begin in the sky, in a Word from God which the preacher discovers and does not invent. His distinctive mission is to proclaim that Word of which he is servant. But he cannot proclaim it without interpreting it, without translating it into the operational realities in the experience of his listeners. He must personalize the truth by allowing the listener to participate imaginatively in the particular experiences in which the truth is embodied. Good communication involves getting within the listener's field of interest and experience, looking at life through his eyes, sitting where he sits. When Aristotle said that the speaker must take into account "the nature of the person to be persuaded," he

[9] *Preaching and Pastoral Care* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1964) p. 16.

uttered a communicational principle which preachers forget only at the peril of not being heard. We do not deal with truth unrelated to persons; we deal with persons in relation to truth. Therefore, the truth is not really our theme; our theme is the person in the pew trying to understand the truth.

Sermons have sometimes been compared to dead letters: they are addressed to nobody, delivered to nobody, claimed by nobody. Their only destination is the dead-letter office where they are taken out of circulation and destroyed. But it need not be so, if the preacher will keep in mind that a sermon begins not only in a Word from God but also in the inarticulated needs of man for which that Word is the specific answer. Communicating the Gospel means putting the Word from God before the people so that they are able to decide for or against it. The essence of communication is *participation,* and "where there is no participation there is no communication." [10] As the Apostle said,

> If you bless with the spirit, how can anyone in the position of an outsider say the 'Amen' to your thanksgiving when he does not know what you are saying? [11]

Since the Gospel is the divine response to man's disorder, it will be the purpose of the preacher to keep in close dynamic relation the Word from God and the agony and ecstasy of human existence. What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

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[10] Paul Tillich. "Communicating the Gospel," *Pastoral Psychology,* June, 1956.
[11] I Corinthians 14:16 (RSV).

MILITARY SERVICE AS A MORAL SYSTEM

Paul Ramsey, Ph.D.

I

The only two military battles I have seen have been on television: Cromwell's victory over the forces of Charles I in the movie *Cromwell* and the battle of Borodino in Tolstoi's *War and Peace*. Nevertheless, in the midst of a controversy at Princeton University over the Institute of Defense Analysis and DOD-sponsored projects at the Forrestal Institute, I told the faculty that, no matter what their objections, I would continue my "war research"—using, of course, books rather than bullets and laboratories.

I hope that you have read the "homework" I wrote which was sent to you.[1] If you haven't, I hope you will. In that chapter I offered an interpretation of the action which is always occurring in the international system, an understanding of which we desperately need to regain today. I developed a religious interpretation of the perennial frustrations of power and of the exercise of the military vocation. If what I said in that chapter is correct, a Biblical analysis of the international system is what Albert Wohlstetter called "opposed-systems analysis." The interstate system is not always in conflict, yet it must be "conflict-worthy" (cf. "sea worthy").[2] It is a field of move and countermove in which a nation must be prepared for *unpredictable* actions coming upon it from abroad. It need not always expect hostility, or always be ready for *the worst*. It must, however, be prepared in terms of the *capabilities* of other nations, and for some of the worst that might happen. It should not reach for absolute security. There can be no such arrogance of power; all power is frustrated. That was the cunning in the verdict at Babel, that power is limited by further power, world without end. No nation can come in out of the storm of move and countermove, challenge and response; here is to be located, among other things (such as foreign economic policy), the vocation of the armed services.

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[1] "Force and Political Responsibility," in Ernest W. Lefever, ed., *Ethics and World Politics*. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972) pp. 43–73.

[2] Albert Wohlstetter, "Theory and Opposed-Systems Designs," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968) p. 22.

Dr. Ramsey is Professor of Christian Ethics, Department of Religion, Princeton University. This article was presented as a speech in Washington, D.C., at a luncheon hosted by the Chief of Chaplains.

St. Augustine taught us that men live in two Cities: the City of God, founded on the love and trust of God and our fellowmen, and the City of Man, founded by Cain and in which there is always some venom of his original fratricide. That is to say, we live in a trust-system and a distrust-system. In all the action coming upon us, we can *also* respond to the action of God by moving with confidence among the living. In all the action coming upon us, we must *also* respond to anticipated moves in an opposed-system, and—at least in our official actions—we must move with caution among the living.

A classic example of the collision in interpretations between the "church" as a truth system and an opposed-system of states is the meeting one day of the prophet Isaiah with Ahaz, King of Judah. Ahaz was inspecting the water works of the city of Jerusalem ("the conduit of the upper pool") to see whether the city could withstand the northern kingdom of Israel, which had made an alliance with Syria to threaten the city. When King Ahaz refused to believe the prophet's assurances that the attack would not come to pass or that the threat was no danger because "within three score and five years shall Ephraim (the northern kingdom) be broken, that it be not a people," Isaiah gave him this sign of the trustworthiness of the action of God in all the action the king was preparing to face: "Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel. . . . For *before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good,* the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings." (Isaiah 7:8, 14, 16).

True enough, according to the prophetic account of these long ago events, the attack did not come. Instead God called up Assyria as "the rod of my anger . . . the staff in their hand is my indignation" to break the power of the Israelite-Syrian alliance. Then he called up Persia to break the power of Assyria, to "punish the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria and the glory of his high looks," for he did not mean to be an agent of the divine mercy but "in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few" (Isaiah 10:5, 12, 7). Yet, without any stolen Jerusalem Pentagon Papers, we may suppose that—unless for reason of the indolence of a petty officialdom—King Ahaz acted responsibly within an opposed-system and repaired his water works. The sign the prophet gave him—itself future—signified a deliverance scores of years later through the providence of the God worshipped in Jerusalem overruling the present threatening actions of states by still greater powers. Perhaps that was a fitting context of action here and now—for the *prophet.* Meantime, however, another context determined the

fitting response needed here and now by the *king*. The waterworks of the walled city, of course, were not finally trustworthy. Inherently that system could last for only a few years, unless replaced by second or third generation defenses, including alliances (which, the prophets counseled, was no way to respond in trust to the action of God in all the action coming upon the tribes around Jerusalem). Jerusalem was saved, not by the water works but only by a miracle (or by a plague in the besieging army) when under Sennacharib "the Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold, and his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold"; and its defenses were finally overwhelmed by the Persians.

The coming of Christ universalized the religious mission of Israel and parted the covenant with the people of God from the covenant with a particular land. Consequently, that desacralized politics and depoliticized the sacred, and brought about in the minds of western man a decisive *distinction* between the two inseparable, intermingled Cities.

The notions of a complete trust-system and a complete distrust-system are, of course, ideal types. The reality of any state-system (and of any actual church) is closer to the intermingling of those two ideal types. This means that the opposed international system cannot be supplanted abruptly or gradually by a trust-system. It means that the kingdoms of this world are not *in historical time* going to become the kingdom of our God and of his Christ, that the shape of the offices and the responsibility of statesmen cannot now be construed in those terms. The power of the prophetic tradition is so strong that contemporary Jews and Christians sometimes speak, in their approach to politics, as if statesmen should act on the assumption that the existing opposed international system is a disappearing reality. That is an indefensible confusion of categories, of "church" and "state"; it amounts to a vain attempt once again to sacralize politics.

Having abandoned every semblance of a Christian theory of statecraft and the function of government, present-day church peace-resolutions are rather to be compared to the prophet Isaiah who finally got around the establishment research institutes in Jerusalem and gained access to King Ahaz outside the city inspecting the waterworks; and who then could only give him this sign: a virgin shall conceive and bear a son; and before he reaches the age of discretion to know good from evil, some other action in the international system will intervene against those actions or alliances coming upon you to render your present action unnecessary. We, however, do Isaiah one better: before too many years, we say, and without a miracle, the opposed system of move and countermove will be supplanted by something

else—a trust system, no less. We suppose one détente can be laid end to end with another détente, and those with others until we build a reasonable facsimile of the Kingdom of God on earth. A more accurate account of the international system would be one which notes that, except in periods of major war, there is about as much *dis-tance* as *détente* in the international system. Only the locations shift—every détente countering a threatening *dis-tance.*

For this reason there are no "wandering" nations—nations which, like our father Abraham, go forth by faith into a far country seeking a good they know not of. That is the business of the "people of God," of the synagogue and the church in all ages, but which is improper for states—just as a direct political vocation is improper for churches. An Israel of the spirit may thus seek the reconciliation of mankind in some distant city. The Israel of the flesh, however, cannot enjoy peace unless it has both "recognized" and "secure" boundaries. An illusion seems to have settled around the U.N. that world politics can be transformed into politics without power. That illusion being the case, we can ask whether a settlement might not already have been reached in the Middle East if the U.N. did not exist. Then the classic rule of the indivisibility of all territory taken in conquest might have forced a negotiated realignment of boundaries in that part of the world, or else some self-executing political contrivance (e.g., a 99-year lease by Israel of a base on the straits of Tiran) might have taken the place of sovereignty over geography in insuring a better ordered peace.

II

If an understanding of the nature of the international system is the first thing needed, an understanding of the morality of war is equally important—and that is my main emphasis today.

I begin by suggesting that if we mean to watch our morality, both private and public, we must watch our language. As Norman Rosten wrote recently:

> We have only a handful of crucial words standing between light and darkness. To blur the meaning of even one is to hasten darkness. . . . We [must] keep our eyes and minds on language as we would upon our sanity.[3]

One such word is *justice,* as well as all the terms comprising the theory of "just war": the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*), justice forbidding war (*jus contra bellum*) and justice in war's conduct (*jus in bello*). To war or not? If to war, how? These are not

[3] *The New York Times,* March 29, 1971.

simply technical or political questions. They are *moral* questions as well. I suppose I was invited to address you today because for a decade I have been a student of the morality of war, and of what a proper moral assessment would mean for weapons-systems and the contours of war in the present day.

In any case, the times are out of joint in the terms we use to praise or to blame. At his trial Lt. Calley could not bring himself to say he ever "killed" anyone. He could only say he "destroyed" or "wasted 'em." That same week an article of mine was published in the *New England Journal of Medicine.*[4] In it, without taking up the substantive question of the morality of abortion, I suggested that if we wanted to think clearly about that question, we should watch our language, that we should cease using euphemisms like "interrupt a pregnancy" (whatever that odd wording may mean) or "terminate a pregnancy." I called for a more apt description of the operation, "killing the fetus in order to terminate the pregnancy," so that we might then get on with a proper debate about the *sorts* of cases in which such killing may be justified. The distinguished editor of that journal, Dr. Englefinger, commented in the same issue that Ramsey's term "killing" was already prejudicial. He, no more than Lt. Calley, could bring himself to say "kill." Instead, he suggested we say "*extirpate* the fetus in order to terminate pregnancy"!

Never say "kill"; say rather "extirpate," "destroy," "waste 'em"—all more indiscriminate terms. Such was the use of language believed most fitting by two of our contemporaries, products of our present culture.

An absolute pacifist and a total devastation warrior are brothers under the skin. One says that warring is such wickedness it should never be done. The other may agree that war is such a total immorality that once you're in it there are no distinctions to be made and no limits upon the conduct of war, or else he says that war is such a calamity that once it's imposed upon you by the other side there are no further questions to be raised except technical ones. The pacifist says there is no distinction between murder and killing in war, and so he refuses to participate in it. The total warrior is likely to agree, if you scratch him, that in the activity he is engaged in there is no such distinction to be drawn. So Lt. Calley *claimed* he never heard of an "unlawful" order. I'm not so much interested in his case, as in the strange agreement from the political "left" and from the political "right" that he was correct in saying so. "Doves" said that a truly lawful order could not be found in the context of an activity immoral

[4] "The Ethics of a Cottage Industry in an Age of Community and Research Medicine," in *New England Journal of Medicine,* 284 (April 1, 1971), pp. 700–706.

on the whole, while "hawks" said that Calley was excusable because, they agreed, no moral distinctions were to be drawn in what he was sent there to do.

III

A preliminary word must now be said about the usefulness of having in one's head the correct ethical *concepts,* and at the same time the limit one reaches when he comes to making practical application of those concepts to factual situations. The latter is a function of "prudence" or practical wisdom, not of theory.

In order to make appraisals of those physical and moral events in the world known as sexual intercourse, one must have in mind some *concept* of the meaning of rape, fornication, adultery, marriage acts—and, today, making a movie. So also in order to make appraisals of a new form of warfare or development in military technology, one must have in mind certain principles such as *discrimination,* or the moral immunity of non-combatants from deliberate, direct attack, and *proportionality,* or the fitness of destructive means to prevent a greater evil than would occur if they were not used.

A theoretician—an ethicist such as myself—may be able to say adultery is wrong, that it is a violation of the covenant and trustworthiness of love, that it cannot be for the good of the parties involved or a widely accepted social practice without the destruction of the family as an essential nurturing community. But an ethicist—or the churches, or a Christian or a Jew speaking *as such*—has no special competence to say, *This* is a case of adultery. That is a question of fact, and not of right and wrong; the fact situation determines the correctness of placing any particular case under our criteria.

You may think that a case of adultery is easy to spot, but consider: for all we know, that couple over there may have made a valid, ratified, even a sacramental marriage; they may only be enjoying a night on the grass in the park! Or, that may be a man who has followed Thomas Aquinas' advice and (rather than be compelled by the external regulations of church and state to live with, *i.e.,* to continue to commit adultery with, a woman he publically "attempted" to marry but could not because he was married already) fled instead into a far country and now is living with that first woman with whom by the unpublicized agreement of consenting hearts he long ago contracted marriage.

There was once a man who was asked the difference between fornication and adultery. He thought for a moment, and replied, "Well, I've tried 'em both, and to me there wasn't any difference!" Instead, he might better have been asked about the special

moral relations violated by these different offence-terms. You may think that actual instances of either offense are easy to spot. Although this may ordinarily be so, consider the fact that one may suppose he is only committing "simple fornication" and then discover that his sexual partner was married. Then the question is, Was that adultery or fornication? It was certainly not a "perfect" case of either.

One faces the same difficulty in passing from an ethical discussion of the criteria for justice in war to a verdict that *this* or *that* was an indiscriminate act of war or use of a weapons system. In moral discourse, it is the concepts that matter; in practice, it is wisdom in their application under stress. Neither an ethicist nor the churches are fact-finders; and it is "riotous moralizing" for them to think otherwise. Nor do practical men, such as yourselves, derive moral criteria *from* the practice of your profession.

I suggest, therefore, that we need one another. We need both a moral doctrine of warfare and aptitude in its exercise or application to ever-changing military situations. Of course, there is no reason why both capacities cannot dwell lovingly together in the same person. You could become so well instructed in the moral doctrine of warfare and the nature of ethical reasoning that you could debate as a peer with ethicists over the meaning of that system of concepts or some defensible revision of it. Or I could instruct myself better than I have in strategic thinking, weapons analysis, and tactics, so as to claim some degree of competence in applying the moral doctrine to the contours and practices of modern war. Or military men and ethicists could also be international lawyers. General Smuts of South Africa was a distinguished philosopher in his day. Still, these are different capacities and vocations, even if it is also the case that in a democracy everyone not only needs some sense of justice, but also should make his particular contribution to the ongoing appraisal of the justice of *this* cause or *this* conduct in war in determining our nation's course.

IV

Having given a chaplain's sex lecture in making the point about the difference and collaboration between moral criteria and application of those criteria in practice, I turn now to a sketch of the moral doctrine and an explanation of the meaning of some of its concepts.

There are *two* principles determining *jus in bello*; these are related but *separate* principles; both apply, and neither subordinates or absorbs or exhaustively interprets the other. A violation of the moral immunity of noncombatants from direct attack need

not be in its consequences disproportionate or imprudent or disoriented from political purpose. The principle of discrimination means more than to prohibit wanton or politically purposeless killing. On the other hand, disproportionate damage need not be indiscriminate. Telescoping the two principles into one happens today when people say, "That was an indiscriminate attack," when they mean, "Great or too great damage was done." That is loose thinking and loose language. There are two separate principles governing the morally acceptable conduct of war.

The quickest way to get to the heart and soul of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate military objectives, between military targets and civilian objectives which should be held immune, is to go back to the origin of this rule of civilized warfare in the ethics which shaped western Christendom and produced it. It was a work of charity, we would all agree, for the Good Samaritan to give help at some personal cost to the man who fell among thieves on the road to Jericho where he had been beaten and left for dead. By one step more, it would have been a work of charity for the innkeeper to hold himself ready to receive wounded and beaten men, and for him to have conducted his business so that he was solvent enough to extend credit to that do-gooder, the Good Samaritan. By another step, it would have been a work of charity, and not of justice only, to maintain and serve in a police force along the Jericho road to prevent such things from happening to travelers. Surely an *ambulance theory* of Christian charity is not enough, but *police action* and other preventive actions are needed as well. So some may go only so far as to say that it might be a Christian vocation to serve in the military forces of the U.N. on a peace-keeping mission.

But may it not also be a work of charity, by yet another step, and in the absence of effective U.N. peace-keeping, to resist by force of arms any aggression against the nation that maintains a police patrol along the road to Jericho? What do you imagine Jesus would have had the Samaritan do if in the story he had come upon the scene when the robbers had just begun their attack and while they were still at their nefarious work? Would it not then be a work of charity to resort to the only available and effective means of preventing or punishing the attack and resisting the injustice? Is not anyone obliged to do this if he can?

To me one thing seems sure: Jesus would not have told a parable about a band of Good Samaritans who, confronted by this choice between the robbers and their intended victim, "went limp" on the Jericho road in the belief that "non-violent resistance" is qualitatively always more righteous than the use of armed force. Moreover, while Jesus taught that a disciple in his

own case should turn the other cheek, he did not enjoin that his disciples should lift up the face of another oppressed man for *him* to be struck again and again on *his* other cheek. It is not part of the work of charity to allow this to continue to happen. Instead, it is the work of love and mercy to deliver as many as possible of God's children from tyranny, and to protect from oppression, if one can, as many of those for whom Christ died as it may be possible to save. When choice *must* be made between the perpetrator of injustice and the many victims of it, the latter may and should be preferred—even if effectively to do so would require the use of armed force against some evil power. This is what I mean by saying that the justice of sometimes resorting to armed conflict originated in the interior of the ethics of Christian love.

Thus, Christian conscience shaped itself for effective action. It allowed even the enemy to be killed only because military personnel and targets stood objectively there at the point where intersect the needs and claims of many more of our fellowmen. For their sakes the bearer of hostile force may and should be repressed. Thus, participation in war (or the use of any form of force or resistance) has been justified in this world to date as an unavoidable necessity if we are to serve the needs of men in the only concrete way possible, and maintain a just and endurable order in which they may live.

The theorists who first justified participation in war did not for many, many years justify private self-defense at the cost of wounding or killing another man! The warrant was rather *public service.* That was the moral meaning in speaking of the "armed services." That, too, is a vocation, along with any other. And we are examining the intra-systematic principles or rules governing that vocation: military service as a moral system.

The justification of participation in conflict at the same time severely limited war's conduct. What justified also limited! Since it was for the sake of the innocent and helpless of the earth that the Christian first thought himself obliged to make war against an enemy whose objective deeds had to be stopped, and since only for their sakes did a Christian justify himself in resisting by any means even an enemy-neighbor, he could never proceed to kill innocent people as a means of getting at the enemy's forces. Thus was twin-born the justification of war and the limitation which surrounded noncombatants with moral immunity from direct attack. Thus was twin-born the distinction between combatant and noncombatant in all Christian reflection about the morality of warfare. This is the distinction between *legitimate* and *illegitimate* military objectives. The same considerations

which justify killing the bearer of hostile force prohibit by the same stroke noncombatants from ever being directly attacked with deliberate intent.

It is never *just* for a policeman to forget the distinction between the bearer of hostile force who must be stopped and the *innocent* bystanders (no matter how mixed up they are). He may hit some innocent party accidentally, but it would never be right for him to *enlarge the target* and deliberately and directly kill any number in the crowd on Times Square as a means of preventing some criminal from injurious action. Nor do we allow the police the right to take a criminal's children as hostages and threaten to kill them in order to *deter* him. Yet the source of the justification of such limited use of force is evidently to be found in "social charity." This is clear from the fact that a man, who in one situation could legitimately be killed by policemen (if that were the only way to save other lives), would himself in another situation be saved at grave risk to the lives of the very same policemen, e.g., if that man is in need of rescue because he has "gone off his rocker" and is threatening to jump from the ledge of a building 20 stories up. If a man should not irresponsible forsake those who need to be saved from an oppressor, neither should he directly and indiscriminately attack innocent people in order to restrain that same oppressor. If to protect his own children he should resist an aggressor, that does not give him leave directly to intend and directly to do the death of the aggressor's children as a means of dissuading him from his evil deeds.

Moreover, if the man in Times Square is holding a hostage in front of him while trying to escape, the policeman doubtless should wait for a better opportunity to capture him. Tragically, the man may kill more innocent people before he is apprehended; but the policeman cannot know that, and we would not say that he did wrong by not killing the hostage to get at the criminal. But if, from behind the hostage, the man is continuing to fire and to kill many innocent people around him, would we not say the policeman is justified in bringing him down even if he foresees and is morally certain he will also kill the hostage? This is a case of "collateral civilian destruction" which may be justified, in contrast to enlarging the target to get bonus civilian damage or deliberately aiming to kill noncombatants who should be spared.

There is one final point to be drawn from these illustrative cases. The objective of combat is the incapacitation of a *combatant* from doing what he is doing because he is this particular *combatant* in this particular *war*; it is not the killing of a *man*

because he is this particular *man* or a member of the enemy nation. The latter and only the latter would be murder. From the proper direction of just action in war upon the *combatant* and not upon the *man* flows the prohibition of the killing of soldiers who have been captured or who by surrender have taken themselves out of the war and incapacitated themselves from continuing it. The robbers are not to be killed when effective robbery is no longer possible, since it was the robber and not the man who had to be stopped.

V

In rightly understanding the "moral immunity of noncombatants from deliberate direct attack," there are at least two terms that must be made clear and kept clear, and which should never be confused, if we are rightly to distinguish discriminate from indiscriminate acts of war. There is, first, the meaning of *combatancy/noncombatancy*. There is, secondly, the meaning of *deliberate, direct attack*. Unless these terms are clarified and kept clear, the simple and not so simple physical destruction of noncombatants (past an unspecified number) will erroneously be taken to mean they have been directly attacked; and the principle of discrimination will be regarded as a test that can be quantitatively violated.

The meaning of "combatancy/noncombatancy" is a function in some measure of military technology in any epoch; it is certainly a function of how the nations and their forces are organized for war. The meaning of "noncombatants," those who are morally immune, is *relative* in the sense that it is *objectively* determined by the manner in which the nations are organized for war, the technology with which they can wage war, the contours of war in any epoch. The problem of distinguishing between combatant and noncombatant, between military forces and civilian life, is tractable whatever an epoch's military technology or posture—under any other assumption than the politicizing and militarizing of everyone in a society, including the inmates of homes for the retarded, as "fighters" in a nation's cause. Only an absolute totalitarianism such as the world has never known could justify total war, or the obliteration of the combatant/noncombatant distinction, even though the latter is *objectively relative* to how the nations are organized for war.

The meaning of "deliberate, direct attack" is another matter. It is a matter of the *intention* of acts of war, of their direction or thrusts in the world, of their targets and objectives, the planned design of the war. From the *objective relativity* of the meaning of "noncombatancy" it cannot be concluded that the meaning of

"deliberate, direct attack" is *subjectively relative,* i.e., that it means only wanton killing or any actual or foreseen destruction. The meaning of "deliberate, direct attack" is relative neither to subjective malice nor to the actual or foreseen killing that is in the mind's eye. It is especially important to insist that one cannot conclude from destruction wrought what was intended and directly done. A great part of the deaths and damage may be collateral, though foreseen. That could be a violation of proportion, even though it would not be a violation of the moral immunity of noncombatants from direct attack; or it may be neither.

This unpacking of the principle of discrimination can be expressed in the carefully-drawn language of the Vatican Council, which said: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities and of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." [5] That statement, as such, does *not* condemn, as politically immoral, actions which physically destroy cities, areas, and populations. It rather condemns acts which *aim indiscriminately at* such destruction. To understand the moral immunity of noncombatants from deliberate, direct attack, and the possible acceptability of their collateral destruction, one has only to understand the difference between "aiming indiscriminately" at populations and "aiming discriminately" at legitimate (combatant or military) targets. Discrimination in acts of war never meant killing only combatants without ever killing noncombatants. It certainly never supposed they are or could be *separated.* It means rather to forbid *directly* attacking noncombatants, to forbid aiming indiscriminately at everyone alike. To acknowledge the force of this requirement, and to abide by it, one does not need to know *who* are noncombatants or *where* they are. One only needs to know *that* there are noncombatants (even only inmates of homes for the retarded) to know that he should confine his targeting to *known* legitimate military targets while limiting circumambient damage as much as possible. Necessary "collateral destruction" is permitted, but only if what is at stake in the encounter is great enough.

Suppose, in the debate going on now, someone charges concerning the bombing in North Vietnam: "If the dikes are in close proximity to a potential bombing target, the policy of the Administration is to bomb *the target* anyway, *regardless of consequences.*" He would be making a serious charge. He might mean to accuse the Aministration of wantonness or recklessness in bombing—in that the Administration did not carefully avoid the dikes,

[5] "Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World," in Walter M. Abbott, S.J., *The Documents of Vatican II.*

perhaps even having in view the destruction of the dikes as "bonus civilian damage."

But suppose he does not say that our policy is to bomb *the target* anyway. He says rather that, in the case of military targets in close proximity to dikes, the policy is "to bomb *the dikes* anyway, regardless of consequences." Such a person would owe this nation an explanation of *how he knows* any such thing to be the deliberate policy of our government. An adversary who has the cunning to locate an underground command post near Colorado Springs or Omaha, or surface-to-air missiles on top of or near dikes, or oil storage dumps near the sluices, does not thereby place these military targets in an "off-limits" category. Unfortunately, many people are ignorant of these basic, systemic laws of warfare.

VI

The morality of war's conduct and the morality of the deterrence of war cannot be separated. Whatever is wrong to *do* is also wrong to *threaten,* i.e., to "mean to do." If aiming indiscriminately in actual acts of war (or in fight-the-war policies) is wrong, so also is threatening to carry out an indiscriminately aimed action wrong to adopt in deter-the-war policies. Although actually to do an evil deed for the sake of supposed good to come is, of course, a different wrong—and, we may allow, a far greater wrong—than simply to threaten seriously to do that action for the sake of the good to come (deterrence), still these two things are qualitatively cut from the same cloth. To put the point bluntly, if counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrent threats are also murderous. The question, therefore, of the ethical justification of deterrence depends crucially on a question of fact, or of plannable policy, namely, whether the only *effective* deterrent must be suspended from the meant mutual threat of ultimate indiscriminate destruction. If so, then deterrence is irremediably a political immorality, even though to carry out the threatened indiscriminate destruction would be a different species of murderousness, and of course a far greater wrong *of its kind.*

Nevertheless, the safety of our nation and the peace of the world need not be built over a moral abyss. Modern warfare (whether by this we mean nuclear war or sub-conventional war) becomes *disproportionate,* i.e., disoriented from the capacity to effectuate political purposes that are worth it, sooner than it becomes *indiscriminate* (since the latter is a matter of the aim and direction of acts of war and varies with military technology and the nations' organization for war). This fact, I argue, provides

grounds for a radically different analysis of a feasible deterrence and consequently of the moral justifiability of a possible deterrence, which I call "graduated" deterrence—in contrast to deterrence that is "suspended" from the ultimate Whoosh! and whose effectiveness is supposed at all lower levels to be indivisibly connected with a conditional willingness to invoke that final political immorality. Since I deny the necessary dependence of the deterrence we need upon seriously threatening the indiscriminate destruction of populations, I argue for the morality of the deterrent possession of nuclear weapons.

The feasibility of a counter-combatant deterrent cannot be argued here. Would not the capability and credible threat to destroy with "tender loving care" the Russian forces massed on the Chinese border be more deterrent than to threaten (less credibly) her cities? [6] In any case, the moral doctrine of warfare seems to lead to greater concern for live Americans than for dead enemy civilians and away from a policy based primarily on "mutual assured destruction"—the acronym for which is MAD.[7]

Justice in war and in deterrence should lead to grave reservations about the SALT agreements. The *Wall Street Journal* called attention to this "worrisome" aspect of the agreements. "The limits on offensive weapons last only five years," it editorialized, "while the treaty limiting defensive weapons is perpetual." [8]

> Mutual assured destruction is probably the best we can do under present technology, though the pact outlaws defensive arrangements that might make it more stable. But if technological advance permits the defense of populations, might not we want to pick up that option? Are we sure enough of the answer we want to foreclose the question in perpetuity?

The moral doctrine of war leads to far deeper questions about deterrence than one senator's concern over parity or subparity in mutual assured destruction. It certainly leads away from the greater reliance on a MAD policy which would be the inevitable consequence of cuts in the variety and amplitude of U.S. military preparedness.

[6] Bruce M. Russett, "Short of Nuclear Madness," in *Worldview*, April 1972, pp. 31–37.
[7] Donald G. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," in *National Review*.
[8] "Go Slow on SALT," May 30, 1972.

A CHANGING CONCEPT OF THE CHAPLAINCY

Cyril R. Mill, Ph.D.

Recently black enlisted men at an army post began to hold a series of informal meetings in the chapel during evening hours. The post command viewed these as unauthorized meetings and ordered the chapel to be locked at 1700 hours, but the men continued to meet elsewhere. In a series of moves the situation appeared to be escalating, with sharp polarization of one side against the other. A confrontation with unpredictable consequences seemed to be imminent.

A chaplain on the post had been keeping in touch with these events, but just at this time he received orders for transfer. Before leaving he contacted another chaplain assigned to one of the post units with a high proportion of black troops and suggested that he contact them and find out what he might do to alleviate the situation. The other chaplain's response was, "Race relations is a command responsibility. I have no reason to get involved."

It is obvious that these two chaplains have different ideas of their role. One sees himself as "proactive," socially concerned and ready to take personal and professional risks in the interests of his men. The other concerns himself primarily with matters which he considers to be "spiritual." His stance on social issues is passive, reactive rather than proactive, and in the area of daily affairs he prefers to occupy the position of a bystander. These two views of the Army chaplaincy illustrate the measure of difference between the old and the new.

A concerted effort is underway to change the self concept of Army chaplains from reactive to proactive, toward a more aggressive involvement with social concerns in the military environment. It is intended that chaplains will become a force of consequence in the eyes of the military community.

A key paragraph in the Objectives of the Chief of Chaplains for the 1970's reads that the chaplain is expected to "encourage individual and social change within the military community in order that people may more fully express their individual identity, achieve group cohesiveness and be witness to God." The phrase, "encourage individual and social change" carries far-reaching implications. It suggests that it is no longer enough for the chaplain to provide religious activities and services for the soldier on duty and his dependents, for the sick and wounded, for those

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in stockades and for the dying. He must also become an agent of change for his people and his organization.

The statement goes on to suggest ways in which the chaplain can promote change: he must

—develop a diversity of religious services for the expression of the differing life styles of young people of today.

—support the "professional team" concept and develop his own skills in cooperating with other disciplines.

—include experimental approaches in religious education schools.

—develop creative programs such as coffee house ministries, and group learning opportunities for individuals and couples.

—establish interest-oriented action groups.

—creatively identify needs for schooling in management areas.

—develop experimental programs of innovative styles of ministry.

—develop a concept of post programming to insure that new ideas, attitudes and behavior are identified and developed.

—support crisis ministries in the area of drug abuse and racial tensions.

The Chief's Objectives imply that the Army chaplaincy plans to develop a more vigorous action program during this decade. Many chaplains, however, feel threatened by the idea. One who was participating in a discussion group on this topic remarked, "I was trained to be a minister of the gospel. I don't know how to be a social worker." To sweep these Objectives under with such a label is to do them an injustice. This man can be helped to find ways to develop skills so that his presence will be consequential in human affairs as well as in the spiritual life of his community. Such help is available. Many are already making use of it and moving out to work on interdisciplinary task forces, in half-way houses in the drug program, using new and more effective teaching methods which employ group techniques and by opening new communication channels to blacks, women, and other minorities. Such actions require an attitude change, but to many chaplains the idea of changing the way he feels about himself and his role in life is quite threatening. Yet the chaplain of the '70's cannot continue to do only what he has done in the past. He must invent new roles for himself and try them out; he must see himself as a moving force, as an initiator; he must see the inequities in our society and have the courage to try to do something about them. Without giving up the best of tradition, he must enlarge the concept of the chaplaincy which will carry over into the future.

This is an exciting venture into new forms of ministry. Chaplains have untested resources for bringing about an increased humanization of life in the service. They have power at their command which is rarely used: the power of the church, the power of their position as representatives of right and justice, the power of their individual personalities and the power to limit the extent to which they will accede to the restrictions which bind other branches of the service.

The goal is to develop an Army chaplaincy in which each chaplain actively engages in a ministry which encourages individual and social change in the military community, toward an increased development of human potential and social justice. To achieve a goal such as this is an undertaking of considerable magnitude which involves change in the way chaplains define their role, change in attitudes toward their work and in their acceptance of the status quo. They must learn new skills such as those used elsewhere by change agents. There are several steps which must be taken:

1. Chaplains at all levels must become increasingly aware not only of inequities in the system which stultify the growth of human potential, but also of the power which lies in their hands to do something about them.

2. Chaplains must develop numerous new skills for promoting social and individual change which are not usually provided in their previous training.

3. Chaplains must create a support system within their own branch whereby senior officers who understand, accept and promote this goal will encourage junior officers to do so.

4. Chaplains must build a new image in the eyes of commanding officers and men through recognized achievement.

5. The new concept of the proactive chaplain must be buttressed by self-renewing organizational mechanisms such as a reward system for new priorities.

6. Chaplains must assume leadership in modelling an ability to be simultaneously *in* the establishment and critical of some establishment practices.

These steps constitute a major and significant program of organizational change. Behavioral science techniques of organization development (OD) are being employed to promote and manage the change process. It is appropriate at this time to review what has been done thus far and to look at plans for the near future. An understanding of OD will assist in putting recent activities into perspective and in identifying steps to take which might otherwise be overlooked.

Let us first review the activities up to the Spring of 1972.

Program Activities, 1970–1972.

Early in 1970 the Secretary of Defense issued a request to all commands to submit a report to him on their efforts to improve communications between the races. This action on his part served notice to all concerned that whatever was being done was not enough. Race-related incidents of violence and conflict, and a continuing presence of unrest in all branches of the service, were threatening to escalate to the point of endangering mission readiness, both in the continental United States and abroad. A group of chaplains from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, discussing the situation with a consultant from the NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, agreed that they wanted to do more than the minimum essential which might be called for in answer to the Secretary's request. They decided to launch a training program that would make a difference. It would make a difference to the chaplains participating in the training sessions, they hoped, not only in the way they felt in working with racial minority groups but also in their priorities of work and in their definition of the proper role of the chaplain in the Army.

The following activities were planned and carried out during the first year:

1. The 100 career chaplains in training at Fort Hamilton went through a three-day workshop in human relations. The focus of the training was on their attitudes toward blacks and members of the young "protest" generation, with some attention to the relationship of the chaplain to problems of drug addiction.

2. Three-day workshops of a similar nature were conducted at 19 Army posts in the continental United States. Since this kind of training involves intense feelings and deals with content of a personal nature, it was decided to limit the size of each workshop to 24 persons. Each workshop was slightly different from the others, designed on the spot by trainers employed by NTL Institute. Local project officers were appointed to brief the trainers on problems and incidents of concern to the chaplains at each post and to make local arrangements. About 500 chaplains received this training during this year.

3. Twenty-four chaplains from the career officers' course were selected to enter a three-week "Training of Trainer" program. It was anticipated that these chaplains would gain skills and confidence in the use of some techniques of group work and consultation, and become a core for the development of an in-house capability for training of this type.

4. A small research project was conducted on the attitudes of chaplains. It was discovered that chaplains as a group were

neither extraordinarily conservative nor liberal, but represented a cross-section of society much as if they had been drawn from middle management of business and industry.

5. A review and planning conference at the end of the first year recommended a change in training goals for the second year. Training in self-awareness was to receive first priority to assist the chaplains in a search for answers to questions of identity and role, such as "Who am I?" and "What can I do, or should I be doing in my ministry?" Race issues and especially institutional racism would continue to be included as part of the content. It was recommended that the laboratories be extended to four days in length and that more non-chaplains be invited to attend. Training laboratories were to be held in Germany. Wherever possible the alumni of the previous year's training of trainer program would work as co-trainers with the NTL Institute staff in order to give them more experience in conducting small group programs. An expanded research program was designed.

The recommendations from this conference were built into the second year of activity. It was also discovered that the Office of the Chief of Chaplains was already taking an additional step which the conference included with its recommendations. This was to create a new position with a title such as "Director of Human Relations Training" or "Director of Organizational Development," so that the work begun would have assurance of continuity in the future—with reduced dependence upon outside consultants. A chaplain was selected and advised to pursue advanced studies which would further prepare him for the responsibilities of this position.

A parallel training program, emphasizing group techniques with special application to their use with large groups, was conducted during this period by the firm of Reed and DeSalvo of New York. Thus many chaplains had two or more opportunities to derive learning about themselves, their attitudes, and their impact upon others in a group setting during these two years.

By the end of the second year approximately 900 chaplains had been in an NTL human relations training program, along with about 350 non-chaplain personnel. A start had been made on developing professional competence among chaplains in the use of experiential learning techniques, and numerous chaplains were venturing into new areas of ministry. An opening move toward the institutionalization of the use of social science technology had taken place through the establishment of a new position at a high level.

Another research project is underway to determine some of

the effects of this massive training program on attitudes and values. Comments of many chaplains during the program indicated that they were asking themselves serious questions as to whether their ministry was as complete as it might be. They were becomming more aware that they may be neglecting some people such as blacks in their particular military community. Some heard of the activities of others in creating new types of chapel services or in consulting with commanding officers on human and social issues. There was the beginning of a normative change in the way a chaplain could view the scope and potential of his role.

Activities Proposed for 1972–1973.

It has become clearly evident that awareness training in three and four-day programs must be supplemented with skill training, and that these efforts must reach up into the higher ranking chaplain officers with an emphasis upon the human side of management and administration. Therefore the third year (FY '73) will provide an opportunity for interested chaplains to attend longer training laboratories at civilian institutions. Available to senior chaplains will be such programs as Key Executive Conferences and Management Work Conferences, where they can be exposed to modern principles of management along with executives from the civilian sector. Other chaplains will attend laboratories on Institutional Racism Methods in Higher Education, Consulting Skills, Human Interaction Programs, and professional development programs of several types. All who attend these programs will later be brought together for three-day conferences called "Learning Utilization Workshops," where they will assess and compare their laboratory experiences and consider in detail how they might apply them during the year to any chaplain who wishes to obtain individual assistance in diagnosis, planning, or conducting a change intervention on his post.

Organization Development and the Chaplain Branch.

The individual chaplain or the Post Chaplain may be only dimly aware of this overall program. It will be necessary to inform all chaplains as openly and directly as possible that the Chaplain Branch is engaging in a coordinated and planned change program. This will facilitate their participation and reduce resistance. The best way to present this program intelligibly to others is to describe it as an "Organization Development" effort. Organization development (OD) is a technique of planned change using technology developed in the behavioral sciences to assist individuals, groups, and a total organization to examine the process by which it accomplishes its mission. It provides means for modifying procedures so that mission ef-

fectiveness is improved at the same time that individual needs and aspirations are fully considered. OD aids in diagnosing interpersonal, group and intergroup behavior and affects the culture of an organization in the way decisions are made, in its communication styles and patterns, how planning is done and eventually changes on-the-job behavior.

The Army Chaplain Branch is a leader among the Department of Defense agencies making use of modern interpersonal procedures as a means of achieving goals within the organization. (The Office of the Surgeon General is another, as well as the Navy chaplaincy to a small degree.) Only a few of the techniques or interventions of OD which are typically employed in work with large organizations have been applied thus far in the program with chaplains. The chaplains' model has included:

(a) a massive training program,

(b) training of "inside" trainers and OD consultants,

(c) training in management and human relations in civilian courses for selected chaplains,

(d) organizing for new positions and assignment of personnel to interdisciplinary teams,

(e) research, evaluation, and conferences for feedback with recommendations for follow-through, and

(f) consultation on training programs and design, on research, and on varieties of other issues.

The massive training program has served several purposes. It has changed the attitudes of many chaplains toward their role in the military, enlarging their horizons and giving them a glimpse of possible new, exciting areas in which they could work. It has created a desire on the part of some to search for more training opportunities in order to develop skills as a change agent. And it has introduced a new language, which aids further communication regarding human relations, change, social policy in the military, and collaboration for organization development.

OD typically includes other types of interventions which have not thus far been employed with the chaplains, such as team building, inter-group problem solving, broad consultation and data collection-feedback sessions.

Team building is a method of developing a staff, committee, or task force to the point where the members fully share in common goals and have taken time to work on their interpersonal relationships so that confusion in roles and agendas will not interfere with mission accomplishment. The military establishment, because of the mobility of its members, gets much of its work done through temporary systems. Personnel may come and go, but the job of the unit must get done. Increased attention

to the human aspects of the temporary system, whether it is the staff in the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Chaplain Board, or the team of chaplains serving on a post, will pay large dividends both in productivity and personal satisfaction for the men involved.

Consultation as an OD technique has been used sparingly with chaplains thus far. The military, not unlike the business world, can more readily accept consultation in respect to a product than in regard to the process of human interaction. It takes almost as long to learn to use consultation as to become a consultant. It is nevertheless expected that many chaplains, particularly those with higher rank and major administrative responsibilities, will soon feel comfortable in forming a consultative relationship with a trusted behavioral scientist. The first opportunity for this exists as part of the work scheduled for FY '73. Termed "technical assistance," it will enable many chaplains to check out their ideas with a social scientist, perhaps one whom they met at a training laboratory.

Inter-group problem solving sessions are especially designed to work on conflict between units within an organization, or between organizations. If the military world is viewed as a set of interlocking systems, the points where different systems interlock are frequently points of misunderstanding, rivalry, stereotyping, and other dysfunctional behaviors.

One example would be the chaplains on a post and their line commanders. Others are within the Chaplain Branch such as the linking points between the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Chaplain Board, CONARC, the Army Area, and the post. Team building within each of these, followed by inter-group meetings, can provide a new model for improving communications and promoting a more collaborative work-flow.

Data collection-feedback sessions are one device used in team building. This procedure gets away from the "therapy" or "sensitivity training" approach which professional OD consultants have long discarded in working with organizational units, and places the focus on the crucial organizational issues which generally are in need of attention, like the communication patterns, the decision-making process, the ironing out of the interpersonal blocks, and the increase of personal satisfaction in work.

Conclusion

Most of the work of OD described thus far is concerned with issues within the Chaplain Branch, tooling up, so to speak, for the main job which is *to conduct a more effective, far-reaching ministry in the service.* There are two aspects which need attention: the work within the chaplaincy, viewed as an organiza-

tion, and the work which this organization will do. Both aspects must be nurtured at the same time. It is important, however, that the way that chaplains work together within their own camp should reflect the way they work with others outside it.

OD practitioners hold to a primary value: that organizations can be humane and non-exploitative of people. To the extent that the Chaplain Branch can adhere to this value while implementing their program of change in the attitudes and practices of chaplains, they will provide a model for other military commands of inestimable importance.

During the next few years chaplains at all levels of command will have increased exposure to one or another of the OD interventions which will be going on. They may attend a human relations training laboratory, or one of the management work conferences. Their immediate staff may decide that they would like to engage in a team building activity, or use a group problem-solving technique to break through some barriers that are preventing progress on a task. Both outside consultants and inside consultants, who are themselves chaplains, will be available for assistance on activities such as these. As more chaplains understand some of the basic principles from behavioral science, they can put them to use in an increasingly effective fashion.

A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ARMY CHAPLAINS IN HUMAN RELATIONS AND APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

Chaplain (LTC) Wendell T. Wright

INTRODUCTION

The concept of providing chaplains with additional training in human relations almost seems like bringing coals to Newcastle. After all, chaplains have already received years of training in their ministerial profession; many have gone on for additional training in pastoral counseling or other specialized courses. One might think that by virtue of basic temperament, formal education and experience, the chaplain would be ideally suited to meet the exigencies of his daily duties.

However, no training or education, no series of unexamined experiences, and no discipline of extra-curricular reading can fully prepare a person for coping with some of the emerging problems in today's military environment. Three of the most obvious problems serve as examples, namely, the problem of deteriorating race relations, the problem of increasing anti-authoritarian attitudes, and the problem of serious drug abuse. Their solutions all require chaplain professional skills in communication, group leadership, individual counseling and persuasion, and personal strength which are not typically included in the previous formal training of the chaplain.

Much is being spoken and written regarding the relevance or lack of relevance of today's formal church organizations. In partial response to this concern for relevance, the following question needed to be answered: "What can chaplains as individuals and as a group do to raise the level of their effectiveness and broaden their sphere of influence in working with the men for whom they feel a deep sense of responsibility?" The almost automatic answer was to turn to an educational model to help accomplish the rather broad and ill-defined goal of "greater relevance." It soon became apparent, however, that the traditional, intellectual forms of academic experience, of which all the people involved had had at least nineteen years, were inadequate to achieve the goals desired. It was therefore decided that the educational model adopted would have to deal with the *affective*

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as well as the cognitive level in such a way as to facilitate the person's growth toward *wholeness*. It was also decided that the nebulous term *relevance,* when applied to the ministry of the church in the military community, could not be adequately applied unless those people who serve as agents of the church could experience greater integration and acceptance of their total selves. In order for chaplains in the military to make their work more relevant to the real needs of people, chaplains *themselves* would need to experience changed attitudes and behavior.

Over the past twenty-five years, innovative training techniques within the applied behavioral sciences have proven themselves to be effective in changing attitudes and behaviors. The technology of laboratory education has been broadly applicable for adult and professional education, relying as it does upon examining and learning from one's own behavior and feelings while participating in group activities, rather than merely depending upon the more traditional cognitive input gained from lectures and readings.

The utilization of this technique of training for meeting the needs of chaplains is not unlike that which has already been applied to persons working on other professions such as psychiatry, nursing, education, and psychology, to persons involved in business and industry, and to persons who are leaders in community development. The goal in each instance has been to supply some aspects of human development and growth which have been relatively overlooked or omitted during the years of professional training.

Three activities were proposed as part of a total program to take place during FY 1971. The total of these activities constituted twenty-three workshops varying from three to five days in length. Their purpose was to focus on improving communication skills of chaplains in a period of social turbulence in our country. Problem areas emphasized were drug abuse, racial tensions, and changing life-styles of young Americans as they are currently seen in the military community. The objective of this series of workshops was to help the chaplain increase his sensitivity to these problems and enable him to define his role more clearly as a bridge-builder between polarized groups. This was seen as an extension of his role beyond the formally-structured religious setting; it was seen as a vital aspect of becoming more "relevant." The workshops (labs) were designed to help him become better equipped to function as a humanizing influence in the military community in which he ministers.

HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis proposed was that men who have participated in a three-day human relations lab will show a measurable tendency toward acceptance of others, have greater tolerance and, in general, be more lenient in their judgments of others. This change would be reflected in higher scores on a behavioral science test taken at the end of the workshop.

SETTING FOR THE STUDY

The laboratory event described here was a three-day basic human relations workshop conducted at an Army post in the continental United States. The participants were administered pre-lab and post-lab tests, using the Least Preferred Co-worker scale (LPC) based on Fiedler's instrument of measurement.[1] In Fiedler's experiments on leadership styles, the LPC was used as a tool to measure interpersonal perception. The current form is similar to Osgood's Semantic Differential with sixteen bipolar items that range from pleasant to unpleasant, friendly to unfriendly, accepting to rejecting, relaxed to tense, etc. Each of the items is scored by a range of numbers from eight at the most favorable pole down to one at the least favorable pole.

Table 1

Pleasant	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 Unpleasant
Friendly	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 Unfriendly
Accepting	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1 Rejecting

In some earlier experiments which used a slightly different variation of this scale, it was found that reputedly good therapists rated their patients more like themselves than poor therapists who rated their patients as quite dissimilar to themselves. This seems to indicate that there may be some relationship between a person's perception of another and how well they get along.

DESCRIPTION OF PARTICIPANTS

The participants in this study of Army chaplains shared many similarities: all were assigned to the same installation, were

[1] Fred E. Fiedler, *A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967).

volunteers for the Army chaplaincy, were Vietnam veterans, and had been on active duty for periods ranging from 3–14 years. The following dissimilarities existed: they came from a variety of religious backgrounds, i.e., Jewish, Catholic, and various Protestant groups; some were married, others were not; they had differing amounts of experience in small-group work; and their age range was from 29–43 years.

Twenty-two chaplains who had been selected by their senior chaplain came together in April 1971 for a three-day workshop. The participants were selected on the basis of their expressed interest in attending the workshop and their current assignments, which involved working directly with young soldiers in the 18–24 age group. Most had not previously attended sensitivity or encounter groups.

DESIGN OF THE LABORATORY

The workshop was advertised as a human relations lab with a focus on self-awareness and interpersonal relations—with a special emphasis on the relationship of a person's feelings to the three problem areas mentioned above, namely, racism, drug addiction, and changing life-styles of youth. The three-day lab began with a micro-lab which encouraged the participants to relax, to get to know each other better and to get more in touch with their own bodies and feelings. The nonverbal exercises and small group activities occupied most of one morning. The rest of the two and one half days was spent in T-groups of eleven persons each. From time to time the trainer would introduce an appropriate exercise involving some member of the group, or the entire T-group, in order to facilitate interaction among members when verbal communication seemed to have broken down. Most of the group discussion focused on feelings of personal prejudice toward people having a different skin color, life-style, or value system. In order to provide a conceptual base for participants to relate their learning, short theory sessions were sometimes presented which lasted from fifteen to twenty minutes. In these short "lecturette" sessions, the Johari window and Lewin's theory of Force Field Analysis were presented.[2]

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In order to test this hypothesis of change in the direction of openness and flexibility, the 22 participants were given the LPC test ten days before the lab and 19 were administered the post-

[2] For a discussion of these, see Robert L. Golembiewski and Arthur Blumberg, *Sensitivity Training and the Laboratory Approach* (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1971) pp. 60–62 and 293–295.

lab test. There is no adequate explanation as to why three people chose not to cooperate in the final testing. By administering the LPC scale on the pre-lab and post-lab basis, it was thought that most participants would show a significantly higher score. The pre-lab average score, however, was 60.95 and the post-lab average was 61.05. (See Table 2.) The change was not statistically significant (Table 3).

Table 2

Treatment group	*Pre-lab test*	*Post-lab test*
Sample Size	22	19
Mean	60.9545	61.0526
Standard deviation	15.0664-	15.0904

Table 3

One-Way Analysis Of Variance

Sources	*Sum of Squares*	*df*	*Mean Square*	*F*
Between groups	.0981	1	.0981	.0004
Within groups	8865.9015	39	227.3308	
TOTAL	8865.9096	40		

The results of this survey, nevertheless, support the research findings of NTL in their testing of 48 participants in two other human relations labs. Dr. Cyril Mill of NTL states that he found no significant group average change on the dogmatism scale when pre-lab and post-lab tests were administered. There was, however, significant *individual* change on *particular items* of the dogmatism scale. According to Dr. Mill, this indicates that each participant was affected in some way but that the group did not reflect manipulation and wholesale change or, in other words, brainwashing. To the contrary, each person changed or grew according to *his needs,* as *he chose.* Individuals did not come out looking alike, which is an extremely important factor to be noted. This is a normal finding on most pre-lab, post-lab testing. Item analysis showed that some men learned to rely less on authority for their answers and guidance. Others learned to rely more. Some learned to value the group process for bringing out creativity, while others felt less attached to group process. On no item did everyone move in the same direction. Younger men (below age 35) became less dogmatic and were more influenced by the training. Older men changed less. The conclusion drawn in the NTL study was that chaplains represent a cross-section of the American public as far as prejudice is concerned, and that the challenge for NTL lay in seeing what their training techniques might do to reduce this prejudice on an individual basis, whenever the man seemed ready to change.

The following conclusions are made on the basis of the data collected, using the LPC scale:

a. Chaplains tend to be *person* oriented. Growth may be indicated by little change; sometimes that growth is in the direction of *task* orientation, as indicated by a decrease in their LPC scores.

b. Ministers as a group generally have difficulty facing interpersonal conflict and using it creatively; often they have been taught to suppress or deny anger and conflict as being evil. One of the objectives of the human relations lab is to improve honest and open interpersonal communication—including real feelings that exist between people. It may be that as a result of the lab experience some people develop the ability more adequately to face their own and other people's hostility and anger. A "successful" lab, therefore, might conceivably show no change or even a decrease in LPC scores.

There is some serious limitation inherent in the laboratory method in social science. McGrath and Altman have pointed out that "the most notable (limitation) is the relatively artificial nature of the laboratory setting for the study of human social behavior and the relatively limited ability to generalize from findings of the laboratory to social phenomena in real-life situation." [3] This has serious implications for a training program such as this one for chaplains.

SUMMARY

While the hypothesis was not supported by the data collected in this study, we are under the impression that some learning nevertheless took place. Post-lab reaction forms were filled out by each participant in which they gave their subjective reactions to the laboratory event. The statements made anonymously on the reaction sheets and in person verbally to one of the trainers would support the observation made by Tannenbaum, *et al,* namely, that "as a lot begins to happen in these fluid, unstructured training situations, some persons seem intellectually unable to grasp the significance of the process, even when offered a detail map in terms of observations and analysis. On the other hand, there are some who appear unconsciously to use their intelligence to ward off the deeper impact of the training experience. By operating primarily at the intellectual level, they seem to miss the opportunity to discover their own role in interpersonal relations. Words have become entities in themselves; they no longer communicate the kinds of feelings necessary for effective learn-

[3] J. E. McGrath and Irwin Altman, *Small Group Research: A Synthesis and Critique of the Field* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966).

ing." [4] We are convinced that this kind of defensiveness was very strong in the group studied; there seems to be some factor inherent in the early training of a clergyman or his subsequent experience that makes him tend to be a very cognitive, verbal person. In spite of this, however, there seemed to be some progress made toward the integration of feeling and thought, and the awareness of one's total being.

[4] Robert Tannenbaum, Irving R. Weschler and Fred Massarik, *Leadership and Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

THOMAS JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON RELIGION, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Chaplain (COL) Bertram C. Gilbert

One of the crosses the chaplaincy continues to bear—rather than to wear on its lapels—is the argument that its existence constitutes a breach in the principle of the separation of church and state. Even though the arguments for the military chaplaincy are cogent and have been advanced in distinguished papers, those who seek to undermine the position continue to raise objections which arise out of a purist view of church and state relations. This view is thought to be in a line of tradition which reaches back to the founding fathers, especially to Thomas Jefferson. Although the argument from tradition cannot be the whole basis for our current laws and practices, it is nevertheless valuable for us to examine our American heritage—particularly the views of that great inspirer of the Declaration of Independence and author of the Virginia Resolution on religious freedom.

The thesis of this article is that individual selective perception plays a significant role in the way one analyzes Jefferson. In particular, your view of Jefferson as a religious person is contingent upon your own religious background and definition of the word *religious*. Your view of Jefferson's position in regard to freedom of religion will depend on personal tolerance levels; and your view of Jefferson's conception of the separation of church and state will rest on a subjective evaluation of the necessity for the institutionalization of religion.

JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON RELIGION AS SEEN IN HIS OWN ACTIONS

Any attempt to classify or to categorize Jefferson's religion seems, on the face of it, an extreme incongruity, for he himself claimed to have kept the secret in his own heart and to have rejected inquiry into the subject. In a letter to John Adams dated 11 January 1817, he wrote of his response to such an inquiry:

> One of the fan-colouring biographers who paints small men as very great, enquired of me lately, with real affection too, whether he might consider as authentic, the change in my religion much spoken of in some circles. Now this supposed that they knew what

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> my religion had been before, taking for it the word of their priests, whom I have never made confidants of my creed. It is known to my God and myself alone. Its evidence before the world is to be sought in my life.[1]

Even in this passage, however, there is a means suggested for analysis, namely, that of looking at the life of the man. Such a look is revealing both in regard to Jefferson's overt actions in matters which are usually considered under the label of religion, as well as in his reactions to religious affairs. In this section we will concern ourselves with his overt actions.

If we consider Jefferson's life in terms of positive actions and promotions, we see a boy who was reared in a frontier setting without benefit of resident clergy, thus escaping the usual routine of churchly formalities which must have been the lot of youngsters reared in the East. Even his baptism is in question, it being only surmised that he was thus made a member of the church by a travelling missioner.[2] He was evidently untouched in his early childhood by the sort of instruction-by-participation which usually occurs in church-attending families. The result was that he did not develop a strong consciousness of the Episcopal tradition and cannot be thought of as having trotted off to church each Sunday to serve as acolyte or to sing in the boys' choir. Indeed, since there was no church building and no weekly Church of England service either at Shadwell or Tuckahoe, quite irregular attendance must be assumed. Beginning in his ninth year, he did come under the tutelage of two ministers, William Douglas and James Maury, who must have taken time from their instruction in the classics to speak of ecclesiastical subjects, but even here there is some doubt concerning the vitality of the impression made, for the young Tom Jefferson did not like Douglas, and Maury was "worn down by his labors, burdened with the care of his large and growing family. He was already a harnessed if not unhappy man" by the time he taught Jefferson.[3]

As a young student at Williamsburg, he came under the influence of William Small, George Wythe and Governor Francis Fauquier. Small, who had replaced a clergyman on the faculty in the chair of natural philosophy at William and Mary, was known as a skeptic,[4] and all three were deists who had rejected the doctrines of orthodox Christianity. We may take it as evidence of the theological inclinations of our subject that he associ-

[1] Lester J. Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) Vol II, pp. 505–6.

[2] Henry Wilder Foote, *Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Freedom . . . Advocate of Christian Morals* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947) p. 5.

[3] Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1948) Vol. I., pp. 40–43.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

ated easily with these deists and was attracted by their scientific and liberal approach to religious questions. His marriage had to have been performed by a Church of England clergyman, but since these were the only commissioners in such matters, we may assume nothing in the way of religious significance unless we were to infer that Jefferson's silence on this as well as on the baptism of his own children indicated indifference.[5]

Jefferson's attendance at church services of the several sects, held in the Court House in Charlottesville, and the contributions he made to traveling ministers, presents a picture of a rather casual spectator who brings his own seat and who wants the function to continue for the good of the children and the community. Edmund Bacon, chief overseer at Monticello, recalled Jefferson's practice in an interview with the Reverend Hamilton Pierson:

> Mr. Jefferson never debarred himself from hearing any preacher that came along. There was a Mr. Hiter, a Baptist preacher that used to preach occasionally at the Charlottesville Court House. He had no regular church but was a kind of missionary—rode all over the country and preached. He wasn't much of a preacher, was uneducated, but he was a good man. Everybody had confidence in him and they went to hear him on that account. Mr. Jefferson's nephews Peter Carr, Sam Carr and Dabney Carr thought a great deal of him. I have often heard them talk about him. Mr. Jefferson nearly always went to hear him when he came around. I remember his being there one day in particular. His servant came with him and brought a seat—a kind of camp stool upon which he sat. After the sermon there was a proposition to pass round the hat to raise money to buy the preacher a horse. Mr. Jefferson did not wait for the hat. I saw him unbutton his overalls, get his hand in his pocket, and take out a handful of silver, I don't know how much. He then walked across the Court House to Mr. Hiter, and gave it into his hand. He bowed very politely to Mr. Jefferson, and seemed to be very much pleased.[6]

The positive contribution to the cause of religion most often noted in Jefferson's pre-presidential action is in his supposed authorship of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in which document Article 3 states that religion is necessary for good government. This ordinance, however was written not by Jefferson but probably by Nathan Dane and Rufus King.[7] The Ordinance of 1784 which Jefferson did write contains no reference to religion.[8] Even if one were to conclude that the former document had been written in the Jeffersonian spirit, the internal construc-

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[5] Foote, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6.

[6] Edmund Bacon, "Recollections Of Jefferson's Overseer At Monticello," (as told to Hamilton W. Pierson) in Francis Coleman Rosenberger ed., *Jefferson Reader* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1953) p. 69.

[7] Henry Steele Commager, ed., *Documents of American History* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962) pp. 128–31.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 123–4.

tion of the famous passage does not call so much for the encouragement of religion as for education.

As President, Jefferson seems to have been willing to go beyond keeping his religion a strictly private matter, even suggesting in several formal letters to various clients that he believed in the efficacy of intercessory prayer. Although custom and formal usage of the times must be taken into account, the fact remains that they are Jefferson's words. A particularly poignant passage is in a letter to the Chiefs of the Cherokee in 1807.

> My Children, I thank you for your visit and pray to the Great Spirit who made us all and planted us in this land to live like brothers, that he will conduct you safely to your homes and grant you to find your families and your friends in good health.[9]

His second inaugural address contains a similar indication of his belief in prayer and the providence of God.

> I shall need too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are; who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with his providence and our riper years with his wisdom and power; and to whose goodness I ask you to join in supplication with me. That he will enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils and prosper their measures.[10]

In his later years, Jefferson began to write in this vein even in personal correspondence, so that his letters gain a warmth and reverence which is of a different quality from his earlier writings. Thus in a letter to a namesake, Thomas Jefferson Smith, he writes of an after-life in which friends will be united for eternity and suggests that Smith should "adore God."[11] Again, in dealing with so secular a matter as participation in The Berkshire Agricultural Association, he quoted Scripture and suggested prayer to Elkanah Watson on 8 May 1817:

> I know with the preacher, 'there is a time for all things; a time to labor, as well as to cease to labor;' and that this last time has fallen on me. . . . I have therefore to offer only my prayers for success to the efforts of others . . .[12]

Despite the fact that Jefferson did seem to become warmer in his expression of religious matters in his later years, his activism in religious causes did not increase. While he had professed adherence to the teachings of Unitarian Joseph Priestley and enthusiasm for liberal religious teachings in general, he seems to

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[9] A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903) Vol. XIX, p. 149.

[10] American State Papers, Class I., Foreign Relations I., p. 66.

[11] Paul Leicester Ford ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1892–99) Vol. XII, p. 405.

[12] Winslow C. Watson, *Men And Times of The Revolution Or Memoirs of Elkanah Watson* (New York: Dana & Co., 1856) p. 468.

have been inactive in promoting such religion in his own county. He wrote to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse on this subject on 18 July 1822:

> The population of my neighborhood is too slender and is too much divided into other sects to maintain any one preacher well. I must therefore be contented to be a unitarian by myself, although I know that there are many around me who would become so if once they could hear the questions fairly stated.[13]

Some mitigation of this passive attitude might be found in a consideration of Jefferson's distaste for misssionary activity, an endeavor which he considered to be presumptuous. Such an attitude is related to his abhorence of religious intimidation, to be discussed later, and is shown in its full force in his criticism of a Bible society for starting work in China. Writing to Adams on 25 November 1816, he says, "These incendiaries, finding that the days of fire and faggot are over in the Atlantic hemisphere, are now preparing to put the torch to the Asiatic regions." [14] It would seem, nevertheless, that Jefferson was content to play a passive role and not even to have considered himself responsible for seeing that his Unitarianism was "fairly stated."

One fair statement of a man's interest in religion is to be found in his will. In such documents grateful reference to God's providence or the inclusion of bequests for the support of His work will signify interest. In Jefferson's case there is no such indication.[15] He did, however, end his life with a phrase to warm the hearts of religionists and patriots alike: "I now resign my soul, without fear, to my God: my daughter to my country." [16]

From this analysis it is possible to conclude that, in his positive actions, Jefferson was not exceptionally interested in religion. On the other hand, the writings of Jefferson are so filled with references that, on the basis of this quantity alone, another view must be added as a corrective. The explanation of this seeming contradiction lies in the fact that most of the writings related to religion are reactions against religious forms, doctrines and impeachments by their devotees.

JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON RELIGION AS SEEN IN HIS REACTIONS TO THE VIEWS AND PRACTICES OF OTHERS

The great wealth of comments on religion in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, as well as some of his most important actions in regard to religious affairs, are for the most part reactions

[13] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XV, p. 391.
[14] Cappon, *op. cit.*, p. 496.
[15] Lipscomb & Bergh, Vol. XVII, pp. 465–470.
[16] Foote, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

against views and practices which he considered to be erroneous, intolerable or infringements of the liberties of others. Among these reactions are several which we will consider again under separation of church and state and religious liberty, but will include here as well to indicate that they stem from a negative view of the status quo.

First, there is Jefferson's draft of a constitution for Virginia in 1776, which included an article calling for religious freedom. Here he was reacting against the Virginia Act of 1705 which must have irked him in its denial of the right to hold other than Trinitarian views. His proposed constitution, therefore, included the phrase, "All persons shall have full and free liberty of religious opinion; nor shall any be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious institution." [17]

Although this draft was rejected, a bill of rights was adopted at his instigation and with assistance from Madison, which read in part:

> That religion, or the duty which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity, towards each other.[18]

Jefferson was, from 1772 on, a member of a Virginia legislative committee on religion. In this capacity he wrote extensive notes, arguments, and the essential contents of a bill which finally passed into law in 1786. He himself considered this bill to be of his greatest contributions. In the notes and arguments he can be seen taking the side of the many sects excluded by the establishment, not because he agrees with their theological positions, but because he is opposed to the establishment. This is certain, because in the arguments themselves Jefferson emerges as a rationalist who will draw on history, Scripture, Locke and Shaftesbury to conclude that many theological doctrines are not part of the natural law and that, far from having any universal truth, the sects are private societies.[19] Far too much has been made of the *endowed by their creator* phrase in the Declaration of Independence by those who want to make it seem that Jefferson was a hero in the cause of those religious institutions which direct the worship of a Creator. In fact, that very phrase seems to have been a second thought and was probably added to win the support of religious groups in the cause of independence, for the first

[17] Julian P. Boyd, ed., *The Jefferson Papers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) Vol. I, p. 353.

[18] William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal, eds., *The Papers of James Madison* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) Vol. I, p. 175.

[19] Boyd, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 535–45.

rendering reads, "all men are created equal and that from that equal creation they derive rights. . . ." [20]

In the same general stance against the prescriptions of religion, Jefferson criticized the Constitution for its failure to extend religious freedom through a bill of rights, and he is usually credited with great influence in the passage of the First Amendment even though he was in France at the time. Here he seems to have been reacting against what he considered to be a Federalist attempt to establish one church as the pre-eminent one. He placed Federalists and Establishmentarians in the same camp. His fears did not die quickly, for in 1798 his original draft of the Kentucky Resolutions attacks the Federalists in Article 3 on establishment, which reserves to the states and the people the right in matters of religion.[21]

Jefferson's election to the Presidency in 1800 was viewed by many Federalist clergymen as a great catastrophe, signalling the victory of atheism. Federalist editors searched for proof and were not bound by restriction to primary sources. The author of a letter in William Cobbet's *Porcupine Gazette* picks Jefferson's words from the mouth of Volney, who in turn is quoting from the *Notes On Virginia,* in the following passage.

> Volney, a French democrat who has distinguished himself among Frenchmen by his peculiarly artful attacks on the Christian Religion, has lately resided among us and credits the man put forward to be President to wit: 'An infidel and an atheiste (sic.) are considered by the author of the Notes on Virginia as by no means dangerous to society. . . .' Americans now have everything in danger, independence, liberty and religion.[22]

The fears of the Federalists and Establishmentarians were not entirely without reason, for while Jefferson's religious views were not entirely public, there were some who had grave doubts and troubled minds from what they had been able to observe at first hand and in the intimacy of Jefferson's home. The impression of the painter Col. John Trumbull of a party he had attended in that home in 1793, during which Senator Giles of Virginia held forth, with Jefferson's approval, is a case in point.

> [Giles] proceeded so far at last, as to ridicule the character, conduct and doctrines of the divine founder of our religion. . . . Jefferson, in the meantime, smiling and nodding approbation on Mr. Giles, while the rest of the company silently left me and my defense to our fate; until at length my friend, David Franks, (first cashier of the Bank of the United States) took up the argument on my side. Thinking this a fair opportunity for evading further conversation on this subject, I turned to Mr. Jefferson and said,

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[20] Ford, *op cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 42–3.

[21] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XVII, p. 381.

[22] Gilbert Chinard, ed., *Volney Et L'Amerique* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1923) pp. 7–8.

'Sir, this is a strange situation in which I find myself; in a country professing Christianity, and at a table with Christians, as I supposed, I find my religion and myself attacked with severe and almost irresistible wit and raillery, and not a person to aid my defense, but my friend Mr. Franks, *who is himself a Jew.*' For a moment this attempt to parry the discussion appeared to have some effect; but Giles soon returned to the attack, with a new virulence, and burst out with . . . 'It is all miserable delusion and priestcraft; I do not believe one word of all they say about a future state of existence, and retribution for actions done here. I do not believe one word of a Supreme Being who takes cognizance of the paltry affairs of this world, and to whom we are responsible for what we do.' I had never before heard, or seen in writing, such a broad and unqualified avowal of atheism.[23]

In 1800 Hamilton was writing to Jay, calling on him to bend every effort to prevent an atheist from being elected; and two years later he was urging the organization of The Christian Constitutional Society, for the purpose of upholding the Constitution and the Christian Religion.[24] Thus, if on the one hand the opponents of Jefferson had some cause for concern about his religious views, Jefferson also had justification for reaction against what he believed to be a league between Federalists and those who would establish religion.

The theological content of this reaction is to be found in his *Syllabus* of 1803, for while he refused to engage in public controversy on the subject, claiming as he did in a letter to Monroe in 1800 that it would be impossible to answer all the lies and slanders, he did write a letter to Benjamin Rush on 21 April 1803 containing a comparison of the doctrines of Jesus with others. From this *Syllabus* and from his own comment on it in a letter to William Short on 13 April 1820,[25] we can conclude that Jefferson's views at the time were on the following order:

1. The Old Testament religion was valuable for its monotheism, but faulty in ethics and in the conception of the one God.
2. Jesus was a human hero and reformer who produced a superior moral system which was, nevertheless, defective.
3. Christianity as it has come down to us in the church is a corruption of the simple teaching of Jesus.[26]

Further reaction to the regularly established religious communities may be seen in his project for re-editing the Gospels,[27]

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[23] Theodore Sizer ed., *The Autobiography of Colonel John Trumbill: Patriot-Artist 1756–1843* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953) pp. 174–5.

[24] Henry Cabot Lodge ed., *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904) Vol. X, pp. 372–3.

[25] Lipscomb and Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XV, pp. 243–8.

[26] *Ibid.*, Vol. X, pp. 379–85.

[27] Probably begun in 1804.

an exercise which he first worked out in rough form while President and which he completed in 1819. This is the so-called 'Jefferson Bible' which was printed at government expense in 1904 and which is reproduced in Lipscomb and Bergh.[28] From this editing of the Gospels, one can gain an insight into Jefferson's religion by noting the sections he omits. A full analysis is impossible here, but a few examples of the method may suffice to indicate the validity of certain conclusions. He omits Luke's first chapter, thus denying the Virgin Birth. He omits Luke 2:49–50 in which Jesus claims God as His Father, thus denying the divine relationship. He omits Matthew 26 with its Lord's Supper scene, thus seeming to deny the value of the sacrament. He omits all miracles and ends the story prior to the Resurrection, thus seeming to deny the power of God to interfere with the laws of nature.

It is unfair to say, merely because Jefferson did not include Old Testament writings or sections from books other than the Gospels in this work, that he was negative in regard to the rest of Scripture. This was a work which he called "The Life and Morals of Jesus" and it has a right to stand on that thesis, but we can derive such a conclusion from other comments he makes. In writing to William Short on 4 August 1820,[29] he fairly tears apart the whole Jewish religion in favor of his own version of the religion of Jesus. His rejection of the Pauline Epistles is equally vehement in the letter to Short on 13 April of the same year.[30]

In these and other writings, Jefferson was quietly reacting against and striking out at doctrines held by Calvinists, Lutherans, Jesuits, Episcopalians and his special pique—any and all who accepted the Athanasian Creed. He was castigating those who would posit some creed and thereby seem to imply that others were wrong for not accepting it. For the whole of Jefferson's stance is based on liberty—on individual freedom, which includes as a primary part religious liberty.

JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

On the basis of the previous discussion, it can be seen that Jefferson's views on religion in general are intimately related to his views on religious liberty. In his writing he continually reverts to the dictum of his mentor Wythe, who had said, "We are accountable to God alone for our religious views." But before this doctrine of private accountability could be implemented into

[28] Vol. XX.
[29] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XV, pp. 257–264.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 243–8.

law Jefferson was schooling himself in the precise arguments which had to be used against the establishment. As early as 1771 he was engaged in the case of Gadwin *et al.* vs. Lunan in which he took the part of a worthless clergyman and showed that, while the court had jurisdiction in the case from the point of a disturbance between two citizens, it could not take the clergyman's parish from him since that was a private matter.[31] The text of his argument is a marvel of scholarly research into the basis of church organization in relation to the King and the community. His research was to stand him in good position to wage what he called, "The severest contest in which I have ever been engaged." [32] It was a contest for religious freedom, which was to be a continuing one, lasting through and beyond his presidency but having its major clash in the attempt to gain religious freedom in Virginia.

His purposes in the Virginia clash are clearly shown in a fragment of a manuscript which must have been intended as a preamble to the resolution for disestablishment:

> For restoring to the *(Inhabitants)* Citizens of this Comm'w the right of maintaining their religious opinions & of worshipping God in their own way; for releasing them from all legal obligations to frequent churches or other places of worship (&) for exempting them from contributions for the support of any (church) religious society independent of their good will (&) for discontinuing the establishment of the Church of England by law, & (thereby) taking away the privilege & pre-eminence of one religious sect over another, and thereby (establish) [several words illegible] & equal rights among all.[33]

His dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Virginia even after the Declaration of 1776 was based on the failure of the Convention to solve the problem of the authority of common law:

> Statutory oppressions in religion being thus wiped away, we remain at present under those only imposed by common law, or by our own acts of assembly. At common law, *heresy* was a capital offense, punishable by burning. . . . Heresy, thus circumscribed, being an offense at the common law, our act of assembly of October 1777, c. 17, gives cognizance of it to the general court, by declaring that the jurisdiction of that court shall be general in all matters at common law. . . . The error seems not sufficiently eradicated, that the operations of the mind, as well as the acts of the body, are subject to the coercion of the laws.[34]

Somewhat later we find him rejoicing in the prospect of elimination of religious proscription in Connecticut, seen in the selection

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[31] Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 399.
[32] *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 53.
[33] Boyd, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 531.
[34] Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 263–4.

of Oliver Wolcott as governor of that state. His jubilation is evident in a letter to Adams on 5 May 1817:

> I join you therefore in sincere congratulations that the den of the priesthood is at length broken up, and that a protestant popedom is no longer to disgrace the American history and character.[35]

The whole letter in which the above quotation is made breathes of scorn and annoyance concerning the establishment of religion. But in the matter of religious freedom, Jefferson goes beyond mere negativism and antipathy toward those who, as he thought, were seeking to confine others in slavery. For Jefferson was possessed of an uninhibited expectation that the free competition of ideas was the safest procedure. In Query 17 in his *Notes on Virginia* he writes, "Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal." [36] Even in regard to Catholicism, Jefferson was less fearful than Adams of the reinstatement of the Jesuit order, as he showed in his letter to him on 1 August 1816:

> We shall have our own follies without doubt. Some one or more of them will always be afloat. But ours will be the follies of enthusiasm, not of ignorance, not bigotry, not Jesuitism. Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid minds; enthusiasm of the free and buoyant. Education and free discussion are the antidotes of both.[37]

Jefferson's views on religious freedom were not complex, although an extensive compilation of the variety of ways in which he expressed them might make it seem so. They were as simple as the distinction between intolerance and benignity, which he makes in his first inaugural address,[38] and between liberty and tyranny. He was simply against tyranny and for liberty and was so all his life. His view is summed up in that famous phrase to be carved in a wall at his University of Virginia, "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man." [39] His views on the separation of church and state are, however, somewhat more complex.

JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Opponents on both sides of the present day battle regarding the use of federal funds for parochial schools use Jefferson to make their cases. Thus, for example, James O'Neill quotes Jeffer-

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[35] Cappon, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 512.
[36] Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 264.
[37] Cappon, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 484.
[38] Commager, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
[39] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. X, pp. 174–5.

son as saying, "It is not however to be understood that instruction in religious opinion and duties was meant to be precluded by the public authorities as indifferent to the interests of society. On the contrary, *the gelatin which exists between man and his maker, and resulting from these relations,* are the most interesting and most incumbent on his study and investigation." [Italics supplied by O'Neill] [40] On the other side, George R. LaNoue quotes Jefferson's words from the preamble to the Bill for Establishing of Religious Freedom:

> . . . to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of options which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical; even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern.[41]

There is indeed a seeming contradiction in Jefferson. He was willing to allow government support of religion among the Indians, for in a treaty which he submitted to the Senate in 1803 there is specific approval of such use of funds among the Kaskakia.

> And whereas the greater part of said tribe have been baptized and received into the Catholic Church, to which they are very much attached, the United States will give annually, for seven years one hundred dollars toward the support of a priest of that religion, who will engage to perform for the said tribe the duties of his office, and also to instruct as many of their children as possible, in the rudiments of literature, and the United States will further give the sum of three hundred dollars, to assist the said tribe in the erection of a church.[42]

He did sign bills appropriating money for the salaries of chaplains in Congress and the armed forces and, as we have seen, he did not deem it necessary to refrain from the use of the name of God in his official correspondence. A case might also be made for the change in the treaty with Tripoli; for, while the treaty (made with the Bey in 1797 during the Adams administration) had stated that the United States was in no sense a Christian country, the renegotiation in Jefferson's administration removed this deference to the religious sensitivity of Tripoli.[43]

On the other hand, the burden of the Jeffersonian writings and actions seems clearly on the side of separation. Indeed, the

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[40] James M. O'Neill, *Catholics In Controversy* (New York: McMullen Books, Inc., 1954) p. 85.

[41] George R. LaNoue, *Public Funds for Parochial Schools?* (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1963) p. 8.

[42] American State Papers, Class II. Indian Affairs, Washington: 1832, IV, p. 87.

[43] William M. Malloy ed., *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts and Agreements Between The United States of America and Other Powers, 1776–1909,* Vol. II, pp. 1788–9.

phrase, *wall of separation between church and state*, is of Jeffersonian origin. It comes from his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association on 1 January, 1802, which reads in part,

> Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.[44]

That he was conscious of the fact that the first amendment to which he was alluding in that letter was able to be interpreted in another way is shown in an earlier letter to Benjamin Rush on 23 September 1800, in which we see again that he was fearful of a movement to establish religion.

> . . . the clause in the Constitution which while it secured the freedom of the press covered also the freedom of religion, had given to the clergy a very favorite hope of obtaining an establishment of a particular form of Christianity throughout the United States; and every sect believed its own form to be the true one, every one perhaps hoped for his own, but especially the Episcopalians and the Congregationalists.[45]

It may even be said that Jefferson was rather proud of being a pioneer in this matter, for he claims to have been the first to make the fight.[46] As noted above, Jefferson's study of the question began very early and had begun with an analysis of the common law implications. The first study seems to have been made as early as 1764[47] and had led to his conclusion in the debate on the Virginia Resolution that the church is a private and voluntary society and that

> Each church being free, no one can have jurisdiction over another one, not even when the civil magistrate joins it. It neither acquires the right of the sword by the magistrate's coming into it nor does it lose the right of instruction or excommunication by his going from it.[48]

Even with a group so close to his own views as the Quakers, he could be caustic in criticism of the relationship of that group to a foreign government. A Samuel Kercheval had written a pamphlet evidently seeking support for this sect. The reply he received from Jefferson, dated 19 January 1810, must have shocked him; for it not only slighted the possibility of success of the pamphlet but went on to claim that the Quakers are a

[44] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 221–22.
[45] *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 175.
[46] *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 461.
[47] Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 360.
[48] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XVII, p. ix.

colony of England. The principle established in this letter is that loyalty to one's country must come before loyalty to a parent religious body in another country.[49] For Jefferson was a doctrinaire separationist, in most of his writings, who could see no other principle that that of free competition among unfavored sects.

By 1814 he had developed a complete argument against establishment or favoritism of any kind. He analyzed the way in which 'priests' had turned government to their own ends—in a letter in that year to Adams dated 24 January. Here he criticized King Alfred for having tried to make the Bible the law of the land and claimed that "Our judges too have lent a hand to these frauds and have been willing to lay the yoke of their own opinions on the necks of others; to extend the coercion of municipal law to the dogmas of their religion, by declaring that these make a part of the law of the land." [50] Then in a bit of legal detective work, Jefferson digs back into English history to find that a mistranslation in 1400 of the words *ancient writings* to *Holy Scripture* turned Scripture into common law.

The argument from the Tripoli Treaty change can be mitigated seriously by a reference to a letter which Jefferson wrote to the Emperor of Morocco on 20 December 1803; for, far from suggesting that ours is a Christian nation, he comes down solidly on the side of separation. "All religions are equally independent here, our laws, knowing no distinction of country, of classes among individuals and nations, our [word(s) blurred but possibly 'religion'] is justice and reciprocity." [51]

Two final things should be said about Jefferson's views on separation. First, those actions and writings in which he appears to foster some sort of integration, e.g., chaplains and Indians, are clearly within the context of captive agencies and special societies within complete governmental jurisdiction. They are therefore interpretable under the doctrine of *administrative necessity*. They are not good parallels of the whole society. They are instances of special need, and Jefferson's acceptance is easily understandable in the light of his usual pragmatism. Secondly, Jefferson did not view formal and institutional religion as a permanent feature of the American society. He seems rather to have hoped for a kind of withering away of such organizations, in the freedom of clear thinking. Such clear thinking would produce a benign rather than activist religion. Writing to Adams on 5 May 1817 he says, "If by *religion* we are to understand Sectarian dogma, in which no two of them agree,

[49] *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 341.
[50] Cappon, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 422.
[51] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. XXIX, p. 135.

then your exclamation on the hypothesis is just, 'that this would be the best of all possible worlds with no religion in it.'" [52] Again on 11 April 1823 he writes to Adams, "But we may hope that the dawn of reason and freedom of thought in these United States, will do away with all this artificial scaffolding and restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines of the most venerated reformer of human errors." [53]

Jefferson's view on separation is therefore not simply mechanistic, although he is proud of the political solution, but partly utopian, looking for a time when the extant religion will have as its own right concept, a disinterest in the need for integration.

CONCLUSION

"I am a Christian in the only sense in which I believe Jesus wished anyone to be, sincerely attached to his doctrines in preference to all others; ascribing to himself every human excellence, and believing that he never claimed any other." [54] With this *credo* of Jefferson we can conclude by observing that the evangelical Christian will be grieved that so good and reasonable a man gave up, as he said, his searching and questioning in matters of revelation so early in life.[55] It seems a contradiction for a man with such insights, such dreams and such an active inquisitiveness to have settled for an expurgated rather than an amplified version of the faith.

The liberal theologian, reading Jefferson's writings, may warm to him on the basis of his courage to challenge dogmatic formulations without giving up the essential concept of the sovereignty, integrity and power of God. He may also see in Jefferson something of a pioneer in textual criticism, and he may revel in the splendid picture of a President sitting down to pour over the pages of Greek, Hebrew, Latin and English versions of the Gospels. To the evangelical and the liberal alike, however, Jefferson will be recognized as one of that great majority who, while asking that religion be down to earth, would rather that it be without the form.

Perhaps it would be fair to say that just as Jefferson believed good government to be that which governs least, he believed good religion to be that which demanded the least commitment. Further, one might hazard the thought, that had he been a clergyman rather than a politician, he might have found the nourishment of religious parties and the use of authority a requirement in some exigencies.

[52] *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, pp. 108–9.
[53] *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, pp. 425–30.
[54] *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 385.
[55] Ford, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 320.

In fact, under the topic, religious liberty, we find him hinting at the value, if not the authority, of such parties, for he says in his *Notes on Virginia,* "Difference of opinion is advantageous to religion . . . . reason and persuasion are the only practical instruments by which men can be gathered into the fold of truth." [56] But here again your view of Jefferson will depend on your own tolerance. If you think that your faith is the *truth* and you believe that ideas are nothing less than precious quantities, it may seem as unreasonable to allow the proliferation of harmful thoughts as it is unreasonable to allow unfit judges on the bench.

If, on the other hand, you are optimistic about human nature and man's power to reason through to spiritual truth, you may be enthusiastic about the freedom Jefferson won for Virginia and America. Certainly it must be said that the Jeffersonian heritage of religious freedom has been one of the primary reasons why religion has thrived on the American scene during the same time that it was faltering in those countries where establishment remained the principle.

The Jeffersonian "wall of separation" was thus a blessing to America in those years when America was expanding to become an "Empire for Liberty." Still, your view of the "wall of separation" principle will depend on your judgment of what America has really become. It has not become the land of the noble farmer and small landholder Jefferson envisioned. Some may feel that far more institutionalization, authority, and intimacy with the state are the requirements of a church which seeks to minister to a highly complex urban society. Perhaps, just as Commerce became handmaiden to Industry rather than to Agriculture, so the wall of separation had to become a benchmark rather than a permanent barrier. In any event, both church and state are indebted to Jefferson for having raised both the wall and the question when he did.

[56] Lipscomb & Bergh, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 222–3.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

Chaplain (COL) Wilford E. Smith, Ph.D.

America's founding fathers struggled with the theory and application of various views on religious liberty and the separation of church and state. The prominent role of Thomas Jefferson in that struggle is described in the preceding article. All of us are aware, of course, that the issues of long ago are alive and well in our day—they emerge in debates over conscientious objection to war, Sunday closing and Sabbath work laws, compulsory attendance at service academy chapels, and financial aid to parochial schools. The purpose of this article is to focus on one aspect of that struggle, namely, conscientious objection to war. Some of the more recent important judicial developments will be considered in an effort to explore the status of contemporary answers to the question of a person's right to refuse to perform military service.

The concept of national sovereignty implies having political strength both to ward off the encroachments of rival states and to maintain political order within the borders of the sovereign state. Without police and military power, it is unlikely that a sovereign state could exist as such. How police and military service personnel are selected and what powers they possess depend in the first place on the political philosophy of a given state.

In time of military need, European states have long relied on conscription and on national police forces, the latter of which can easily be converted into military units when needed. Anglo-American tradition has frowned on both national police forces and large military forces, perferring the allegedly greater freedoms of local control. General conscription became necessary, however, in World War I. Although conscription was discontinued after the war, it was revived in World War II and has remained with us to date. Scheduled to be phased out soon, it will no doubt be reactivated whenever perceived threats to national sovereignty materialize—threats which are thought to be larger than a voluntary military force can handle. Pure political philosophy is thus tempered by actual political realities.

This of course raises the question of who, if anyone, should be excused from conscription. In the past, people have been ex-

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Chaplain Smith is Professor of Sociology at Brigham Young University. As a reserve chaplain, he has been doing research on various aspects of church and state relations at the US Army Chaplain Board.

cused on the basis of age, sex, and health, and have been deferred for educational reasons. In addition, allowance has been made for those who showed a clear and conscientious objection to participation in war. These exemptions, however, were never sacrosanct. When danger to the nation was perceived as great enough, exemptions tended to fade. Thus, for example, British men and women of all ages were expected to fight invading Germans with clubs and pitchforks. Children fought for the South in the American Civil War. Israel has long been drafting females as well as males. Females are now becoming line officers in the American military forces. Russia has long considered it proper for females to enlist in her armed forces. The level of exemption from service for conscientious objection, therefore, varies according to a nation's *social philosophy* and its *perception of danger*. Of course, a person who refuses to fight may hinder more than help a fighting force, so that arrangements must be made to use such people in other than combat capacities.

The American social philosophy with its emphasis on freedom of religion and freedom of expression has allowed for recognition of various degrees of conscientious objection to military service. Section 6(j) of the 1940 draft law passed by Congress expressly recognizes such objection in the following words:

> Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed services in the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this section, the term religious training does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views of a merely personal moral code.

In 1966 Air Force Captain Dale Noyd became the first American to attempt a civil court test of the constitutionality of *conscientious objection to a specific war* rather than to war in any form. The civil courts refused to hear his plea on the grounds that he objected to a specific war. He was court martialed and severely sentenced for refusal to obey an order to train fighter pilots for combat in Vietnam. To this date American civil courts have generally rejected claims of selective objection to war, no matter how conscientious such claims have been.

Judicial decisions have, nevertheless, broadened our understanding of who may be declared a conscientious objector. In 1965, the US Supreme Court ruled that a belief in a Supreme Being was no longer a valid test of one's conscientious objection to war. The Court justified its decision on the grounds that the plaintiff's (Daniel A. Seeger) claim was based on "a faith to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else was ultimately

dependent." [1] This was a giant step in state recognition of conscience without regard to organized religion. The Court contended that "a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption comes within the statutory limitation."

The Seeger case, because of its far-reaching implications, was discussed in several lead articles in journals issued by law schools and bar associations. It raised the basic question of whether the draft law was constitutional. Did the draft law favor persons who belonged to the religious establishment? An article in the American Bar Association *Journal* stated that the Court "managed to avoid the constitutional question . . . by giving a much broader definition to the belief necessary to qualify for exemption as a conscientious objector than formerly. In doing so unanimously, as Justice Douglas observed, the Court was saved from having to void the section of the draft law, which otherwise would have violated the Constitution in several ways." [2]

In addition, the 1966 conviction of Elliott Ashton Welsh II for refusal to accept a draft call in California on the grounds that his objection to war had not grown out of a background of religious training but was based on political, sociological, or philosophical views, or merely a personal code, was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 15, 1970.[3] The Court declared that

> if any individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, such beliefs function as a religion in his life, and thus he is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions.[4]

This ruling would also have pleased Jefferson, since he argued so passionately in favor of the freedom of individual conscience.

The courts have made no other major concessions to date, and in many trials they have consistently refused to honor objection to a specific war. Protestors, however, may *demonstrate* against a specific war as long as they don't block the passage of other citizens or otherwise disturb the peace.[5] Furthermore, if a person fails to register for the draft for five years past his eighteenth birthday, he is then excused from registering by virtue of the

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[1] U.S. V. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
[2] Bernstein, "Conscription and the Constitution," 53 Amer. Bar Assn., Jour. 708, 709 (1967).
[3] 26 L Ed 2d 308, 90 S Ct.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[5] Donald Bachellar et. al. v. State of Maryland, 25 L Ed 2d 570, 90 S Ct., 20 Apr 70.

statute of limitations.[6] In addition, one's draft classification may be changed if he changes his views on war.[7] Such changes in view must be recognized and respected even if they *occur after induction,* and they *need not be of long standing.*[8]

Despite rather general agreement, various courts in recent years have rendered somewhat different decisions in different places, however. Morico was denied CO status on the grounds that his objection was only slightly related to belief in a Supreme Being.[9] Two servicemen were denied CO status in Georgia because their beliefs were not based on religious training or belief and were the "expression of personal and moral codes or philosophies." [10] Of special interest in the case of a Catholic (McFadden) whose objection to the specific Vietnam War was honored by a US Court in California.[11] But the US Supreme Court again voiced its opposition to this type of exemption a few months later in disposing of two cases on the grounds that claims for CO status had to do with a specific war and not to all war in any form.[12] Apparently, however, the McFadden decision was allowed to stand.

On April 19, 1971, the US Supreme Court, in considering the Cassius Clay case, restated the *three basic tests* which a person must pass in order to qualify for CO status:

1. He must show that he conscientiously objects to war in any form. (Gillette v. United States, 410 U.S. 437)
2. He must show that his opposition is based on religious training and belief, as that has been construed by the Supreme Court. (United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333)
3. He must show that his objection is sincere. (Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375)

In the court cases since the Clay case there appears to have been general agreement by the judges on the *legal* validity of the three points listed above, but the question of their *moral* validity has not yet been answered to everyone's satisfaction. Conscience is conscience whether it be related to a specific act or to a general type of act. Obviously certain persons can conscientiously object to one war and be willing to fight in another if conditions become such that they deem the alternatives unbearable. But sover-

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[6] Robert I. Toussie v. United States, 25 L Ed 2d 156, 90 S Ct., 2 Mar 70.

[7] Joseph Thomas Mulley v. United States, 26 L Ed 2d 362.

[8] United States v. Commanding Officer, etc., 318 F. Supp. 571 (Wisconsin, 10 Oct 70), Alley v. Ryan, 319 F. Supp. 981 (North Carolina, 14 Nov 70).

[9] United States v. Morico, 415 F 2d 138 (Connecticut, July 31, 1969).

[10] nited States v. rel Scott v. Tillson, 304 F. Supp. 406. (Georgia, October 3, 1969)

[11] United States v. McFadden. 309 F. Supp. 502. (California, February 20, 1970)

[12] Guy Porter Gillette, Petitioner v. United States, 85 and Louis A. Negre, Petitioner v. Stanley L. Larsen et. al. 325, U.S. 28 L Ed 2d 168, 91 S Ct, 85 and 325.

eignty will be served. In the words of the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Louisiana,

> There is no constitutional right to exemption from military service because of religious belief. . . . "The privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes, not from the Constitution, but from the acts of Congress. . . ." There is no constitutional right to exemption from compulsory civilian duty in lieu of military service.[13]

Draft-eligible persons who conscientiously oppose military service in the Vietnam War have migrated to Canada by the thousands. As that war draws to a close an important debate is developing as to whether or not such persons should receive amnesty. Some argue that it is manifestly wrong for such persons to enjoy the privileges of American citizenship which so many others have lost by sacrificing their lives. Others contend that going to another country was the only available way to protest an immoral war, and that honor demands protest rather than acquiescence if freedom is to be preserved. Where one finds himself on the continuum of points of view on this question must be a function of his information and his convictions. It is a matter of conscience. How indulgent a state will be with freedom of conscience is a question which should concern us all.

Although chaplains in an all volunteer army will doubtless counsel far fewer men who seek conscientious objector status than they counseled during the Vietnam War, their pastoral love for these men must remain strong. A basic understanding of and appreciation for our American heritage—including the development of that heritage by recent court decisions—should serve to strengthen chaplains professionally in this important area of service.

[13] United States v. Crouch, 415 F. 2d 425, (Louisiana, September, 1969). Quoted here from *The Ecclesiastical Court Digest*, Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 4.

BOOK REVIEWS

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

Elwyn A. Smith
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972

THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION

Richard E. Morgan
New York: The Free Press, 1972

If only because of our dual commissioning, we chaplains are interested in the church-state question. We represent one of the longest experiments in the question of the extent to which religious liberty can be retained in a situation where the "wall" is constantly being eroded and rebuilt under pressure.

In two recent books on the subject, Dr. Elwyn A. Smith of Temple University and Dr. Richard E. Morgan of Bowdoin College seek to set out in book form positions advancing beyond Professor Philip Kurland's 1961 classic, "Religion and the Law." In that work Professor Kurland set forth the principle, sometimes followed by the Supreme Court, that religion should not be used as a classification by government. In effect, Kurland's answer to the church-state question was a kind of benevolent *ignoring* of religion per se. The books by Smith and Morgan dissent. Dr. Smith's position is that, just as ignorance of the law is no excuse, so for the law to ignore religion is to court social ineptitude. No matter how the Court may characterize religion in an attempt to hide it amid the noncontroversial, no matter how the law may seek to relegate it to that which is merely subjective, religion will out and will not be ignored. For Professor Smith, the solution is not to emphasize the wall of separation as a dividing metaphor but rather as an "en-neighboring" and order-encouraging principle.

To get us ready for this proposition, he takes us on a dialectical guided tour through the history of the question of the separation of church and state in America. Though difficult to read, it is an excellent chronicle based primarily on key men and key court decisions. The work is thus a valuable reference on the general question and a powerful proof that the record is a very mixed bag.

Dr. Morgan's slimmer volume and consciously limited essay is more of a special brief. It is an argument that the Supreme Court should find the law in the social equity of the situation, as

well as in the strength of popularly held values. This, as opposed to sole reliance on historical or legal consistency, is his prescription as a member of a kind of college of legal practicioners who he feels should minister to the Court.

To prepare us for this prescription, Dr. Morgan presents two brief sketches on church-state experience at the turn of the century and then several essays on the problem in terms of Supreme Court decisions. His summaries at the end of these chapters may be read along with the concluding set piece as a precis of the book's argument.

While both of these works are valuable and do bring the subject up to date, they do not really satisfy with the full weight of the arguments on all sides of the question. That they do not stems from a failure to listen to and to read the real arguments that ordinary people were and are using. For, although Smith knows his theology well enough to give us great confidence, and although Morgan knows the Court so well that his brilliant writing makes enjoyable the run through legal technicalities, we still need the word of someone with a feel for the voices of the people of God within His church, as well as their unsophisticated but potent adversaries outside it.

Chaplain (COL) Bertram C. Gilbert

THE IDENTITY CRISIS

William Glasser, M.D.
New York: Harper and Row, 1972

Three previous books of Dr. William Glasser have been described as courageous, unconventional and challenging. These are *Mental Health or Mental Illness: Psychiatry for Practical Action; Reality Therapy: A New Approach to Psychiatry;* and *Schools Without Failure.* These have offered therapeutic help across a broad gamut of societal need, from the rehabilitation of delinquent girls and the plight of backward "incurable" psychotics, to the everyday frustration of thousands of school failures. Now Dr. Glasser has added another book, *The Identity Society,* which again combines provocative theory with down-to-earth practical applications.

In the first two chapters of *The Identity Society,* Glasser acknowledges a statement by Marshall McLuhan as triggering the analysis of society which Glasser proposes in this book, and then he proceeds to provide a speculative anthropological background. He grounds the present need for involvement as genetic, "fixed in

our nervous system." "Our nervous system uses pain to tell us to get involved with someone." Glasser identifies the most common source of pain as failure to get involved with others, i.e., loneliness. His analysis of the different ways in which loneliness is expressed throws light on much anti-social, self-defeating human behavior.

In *The Identity Society,* Dr. Glasser once again scores traditional psychoanalysis as not only not helpful, but even a hindrance to the recovery of mental health, because it encourages the patient to blot out the present, it excuses the patient's involvement with his own symptom, and it labels his symptom as an illness.

Glasser sees drug abuse, alcoholism, depression, psychosis and physical symptoms such as colitis, chronic back pain and headaches, as "symptom companions" to blot out loneliness; they are *chosen* by a suffering person to alleviate the pain of failure in non-involvement or loneliness. Again, Glasser defines his "reality therapy" for his identity society as a "system of ideas designed to help those who identify with failure learn to gain a successful identity, and to help those already successful to master their competence and help others to become successful." In Chapter 6, Glasser restates the steps in reality therapy.

In Chapters 7–12, the ramifications of an identity society are explored in the areas of family, failure in children, sexual behavior, criminal justice, hospitals, welfare, and community involvement centers. In these chapters the practical application of the principles of reality therapy in the context of an identity society greatly enhance both the interest and usefulness of this book.

Since the time scheme for Glasser's classification of primal survival and primal identity society is prehistoric, one can dismiss his anthropological excursion as neither factually grounded nor even necessary. His present analysis of our society can be examined from a two-fold standpoint: the accuracy with which the delineation of a role identity does describe our society and the therapeutic value of the application of this theory to failing persons and institutions in our society.

Several considerations commend *The Identity Society* to the careful attention of all chaplains. First, chaplains are change agents and thus are vitually concerned with human motivation. The theoretical framework of the concept of role identity, especially in the younger people with whom the chaplain works, can heighten the chaplain's ability to relate and communicate. Second, Glasser himself urges the use of his reality therapy by professionals other than clinical psychologists and psychiatrists

in a broad area of application to failure-oriented people. This certainly enfranchises the chaplain.

Chaplain (LTC) Clinton E. Browne

WAYWARD SHEPHERDS: PREJUDICE AND THE PROTESTANT CLERGY

Rodney Stark, Bruce Foster, *et al.*
New York: Harper and Row, 1970

Two crucial questions are raised in this book, namely, What is the extent of anti-Semitism among Protestant clergy? What is their role in contemporary affairs? This study grew out of an earlier work, *Christians and Anti-Semitism* (1966) which dealt with attitudes of the laity, particularly the correlation of theological beliefs and prejudicial attitudes. Feeling that some of those findings might have parallels among the clergy, the researchers designed a lengthy questionnaire which was sent to all active clergy of the nine largest Protestant denominations in California. More than 1500 clergymen responded.

Using the results of the lay study, the authors began with the premise that some traditional Christian beliefs might lead to secular anti-Semitism by way of religious hostility toward Jews. From theological questions dealing with the Jews as "damned and outside salvation," the authors demonstrate a movement toward emotional hatred—a basic contradiction of the New Testament concept of love and brotherhood. The researchers surmise that "many clergymen act as if Christian doctrine has no implication for human suffering and social abomination."

The study found one possible solution to the problem of how such an apparent paradox came about. A strong correlation exists between feelings of prejudice and conceptions of clergy roles. One group of clergy mainly concerns itself with life-style and quality of life here and now, whereas another group demonstrates a more "other-worldly" interest. The former group is mainly concerned for society and social values, the latter group with individual salvation. It is among those clergy most concerned with individual salvation and otherworldliness that prejudice—particularly hostility toward Jews—strongly manifests itself.

The authors' insights should prick the consciences of all of us who hold firmly to profound biblical and theological insights. They urge us to consider the possibility of harboring unsuspected values and attitudes of prejudice. Some chaplains will doubtless take issue with the thrust of the volume; indeed, after reading

only this review, a few may well say, "Why, some of my best friends are Jews."

Chaplain (MAJ) Billy W. Libby

THE CHANGE AGENT

Lyle E. Schaller
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972

In his book *Future Shock* Alvin Toffler emphasizes that change is occuring at such a rapid rate in our society that anyone who fails to keep pace with it will suffer. In *The Change Agent,* Lyle E. Schaller discusses change from the point of view of persons who most successfully engineer its direction. Although Schaller admits that every individual, by his action or inaction, influences the future, his central thesis is that the change agent possesses and utilizes a *systematic approach* to change and thereby has a tremendous advantage over others. Chaplains who are interested in the strategy of innovative leadership will find this book to be helpful, since Schaller provides a lively and readable handbook for the acquisition of leadership skills.

Some of the ideas which Schaller discusses and which the change agent must thoroughly understand are the following: the tactics of creating discontent, the development of a counter-strategy, various styles of leadership, the management of conflict, and the nature and employment of power. What makes this book different is that Schaller attempts to instill in his readers the Biblical injunction that the children of light should be as wise as the children of darkness.

Chaplain (LTC) Donald B. Beal

ETHICS: ALTERNATIVES AND ISSUES

Normal L. Geisler
Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1972

Chaplains who have enjoyed reading Joseph Fletcher's *Situation Ethics,* but who disagree with its basic thrust, will find in Professor Normal Geisler a more kindred spirit. Geisler is chairman of the Department of Philosophy of Religion at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, Illinois. His book is an exceptional and long-awaited evangelical approach to modern eth-

ical thought. He attempts to steer a precarious course between the Scylla of abstract, strictly principial ethics and the Charybdis of situation ethics. Those who disagree with his conservative orientation will nevertheless admire his scholarly research in both philosophy and scripture.

Geisler divides his book into two parts: Ethical Alternatives and Ethical Issues. In the first part he presents a comprehensive discussion of various ethical alternatives, such as antinomianism, generalism, situationism and various types of absolutisms. He raises three questions in his examination of these: Are there any universal norms? If so, how many are there? If there are more than one, what ought one to do if they conflict? His own position, a normative or deontological one as opposed to a teleological or utilitarian one, is spelled out in Chapter 7, where he opts for a Christian ethical position based on hierarchically ordered universal norms. There *are* universal norms, says Geisler, but when norms conflict one is morally right in breaking the lower norm in order to keep the higher one. He offers the following principles as guides for decision-making:

1. Persons are more valuable than things,
2. Infinite Person is more valuable than finite person,
3. A complete person is more valuable than an incomplete person,
4. An actual person is of more value than a potential person,
5. Potential persons are more valuable than actual things,
6. Many persons are more valuable than few persons, and
7. Personal acts which promote personhood are better than those which do not.

In Part Two Geisler discusses major contemporary issues which are constantly brought up to chaplains—issues which concern war, civil disobedience, abortion, sex, racial differences, euthanasia and the like. In this section he attempts to unfold the social implications of the position he took in Part One.

The importance of this book for chaplains does not lie in the particular answers he gives to particular social issues so much as in the ethical framework he offers, by which we can find our own particular answers in a changing world. Soldiers who are given specific answers may be "helped" for a day; those who discover basic ethical principles will be helped for a lifetime.

Chaplain (LTC) John J. Hoogland

SP4 Lorraine Doleshal, Chaplain's Assistant, Fort McClellan, Alabama

• SP4 Lorraine Doleshal is the first Wac to be awarded a chaplain's assistant (71M) MOS. She received on-the-job training at Fort McClellan and then completed ten weeks of chaplain's assistant training at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and Fort Hamilton, New York. She is currently assigned to the WAC Chapel, Fort McClellan.

• The Honorable Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, addressed both the Command Chaplains Conference and the Sixth Army Conference last year. His topic was "The Chaplain and Social Concerns."

• The Office of the Chief of Chaplains is holding regular meetings with denominational endorsing agencies and civilian church leaders. The purpose of these meetings is to provide up-to-date information on chaplaincy programs and to receive feedback.

• In December the US Army Chaplain Board sponsored a conference designed to assist the chaplaincy in recruiting minority

group chaplains. Leading black churchmen and Army chaplains attended.

• The US Army Chaplain School has established a Faculty Enrichment Program in connection with New York Theological Seminary. Faculty members who choose to enroll will be able to earn a Doctor of Ministry degree in approximately two years.

• The Fort Campbell Post Chaplain's Office has established a Family Life Center. The Center was designed to express the concern of the command for the quality of family life in Lee Village. Chaplain (CPT) Loren D. Pugh, a licensed marriage counselor, is assigned to the Center.

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